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RECENT CASES
Antitrust -Treble Damage Actions-Private Litigant
Whose Injury Was Reasonably Foreseeable Has
Standing To Sue
Plaintiff, a seller of motion pictures, brought a treble damage
action under section 4 of the Clayton Act,1 charging his purchaser-
distributor with violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 Defendant
had contracted to distribute plaintiff's films in exchange for a purchase
price to be determined by the profits generated by the distributed films.
3
Plaintiff contended that defendant's "block booking" distribution
technique4 diminished the value of his contract rights in the films.
Defendant, although conceding the illegality of his method of
distribution, argued that there was no causal connection between the
violation and the alleged injury, and that, in any event, plaintiff had no
standing to sue under the Clayton Act because he was not within the
"target area" of the economy "aimed at" by the block booking. 5 The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. On appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held,
reversed. A private litigant whose injury was a reasonably foreseeable
result of an antitrust violation has standing to sue under section 4 of the
Clayton Act. Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d 1073
(9th Cir. 1970).
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) (granting a private cause of action to all persons injured "by
reason or' an antitrust violation).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) (declaring illegal "[e]very contract, combination ... or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce. ..").
3. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, Inc., predecessor of defendant, was to pay $1.5 million to
plaintiff for the film, "Pride of the Yankees." Plaintiff was to receive 82 % of the gross receipts
generated in distribution until a specified date. The outstanding balance, to the extent that it failed
to satisfy the purchase price, was forfeited at that time.
4. Under the arrangement challenged in the instant case, the defendant distributed a large
group of motion pictures as a block on a "take it or leave it" basis. The effect of this method of
distribution was to enlarge the overall receipts for the distributor but to diminish the portion
allocable to the more valuable films within the block. Block booking is a form of tying arrangement
that under certain conditions is prohibited by the Sherman Act. For a discussion of tying
arrangements see P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 438-87 (1967).
5. Previous Ninth Circuit case law limited standing under § 4 of the Clayton Act to
plaintiffs within the "target area" of defendant's violation. This judicially constructed test for
standing required more than a showing of damage physically caused by an antitrust violation. See
Note, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage
Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1016-17 (1952).
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Section 4 of the Clayton Act grants the right to sue for treble
damages to "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 6 The
courts, however, traditionally have restricted the availability of this
remedy by narrowly interpreting the requirements for standing. Initially,
the courts equated standing with the requirement that the illegal antitrust
activity be the "proximate" or "direct" cause of the plaintiff's injury.
7
Because of the restrictive interpretation placed on this test by the courts,
the number of private antitrust actions was severely limited.8 More
recently, the Ninth Circuit relaxed the standing requirement by adopting
a "target area" concept.9 Under this theory, an injured plaintiff needs
only to show that he was within the area of the economy endangered by
the antitrust violation.' 0 Many courts now apply both tests in
determining a plaintiff's standing and, as a result, a considerable degree
of uniformity has been achieved. The courts, for example, have held that
a competitor of the antitrust violator has standing, reasoning that the
prohibited activity is usually "aimed at" him.'2 Similarly, there is
general agreement that an individual who is economically dependent on
the injured competitor lacks standing. 3 A clear split, however, has
6. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
7. E.g., Jack v. Armour & Co., 291 F. 741, 745 (8th Cir. 1923) (conspiracy of livestock
purchasers not "proximate" cause of injury to sellers); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704,
709 (3d Cir. 1910) (stockholder has no standing to sue for antitrust injury to bankrupt corporation).
8. "[A]I indications suggest that prior to the end of World War 11 private action was
relatively unimportant." Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-
Patman Experience, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 181 (1961). "The private antitrust suit, despite its
tender of treble damages, was dormant for years. As of 1940, a half century of private action had
produced a mere 175 reported cases with judgment for plaintiff in only 13." Note, supra note 5, at
1010.
9. The "target area" doctrine was first announced in Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's,
Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952) (no standing for labor
union against employers who conspired to hire only nonunion employees).
10. E.g., Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967), noted in 1967 DuKE
L.J. 686; see Comment, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 132 (1967).
11. E.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (retailer given
standing against another retailer who conspired with supplier to deny merchandise to plaintiff); cf.
Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593, 597 (N.D. Il. 1964) (standing denied because plaintiff
and defendant not competitors).
12. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955).
13. E.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963) (supplier may not recover for injury to customer); Bookout v. Schine
Chain Theaters, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958) (shareholder may not recover for corporate
injury); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 936 (1956) (patent licensor may not recover for injuries to licensee), noted in 69 HARV. L.
Rev. 575, 576 (1956). Two cases seem to have made inroads on this otherwise generally accepted
principle. Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergian Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966)
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developed among the circuits when the plaintiff is economically
dependent on the antitrust violator, but not in competition with him. The
Ninth Circuit is at the forefront of the liberal trend on this issue.14 In
Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,15 for example, the
plaintiff's lessee and a noncompetitor had combined in a restraint of
trade that resulted in a decrease in the rent payable to the plaintiff.
Standing was upheld on the ground that the antitrust violation was the
"direct" cause of the injury. 6 Similarly, in Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. v. Goldwyn,'7 a film lessor, whose rent was diminished by an
illegal allocation of first-run movies by lessees to exhibitors, had
standing because he was within the area that could reasonably be
foreseen would be affected by the violation. The opposite result has been
reached in the Second and Third Circuits. In Harrison v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc.,18 for example, a landlord was denied standing to recover
treble damages for loss of rent. The court reasoned that the plaintiff was
not directly injured by the tenant's antitrust violation. In a similar case,
Field's Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp.,9 the court denied
standing to a film producer-lessor, concluding that it was not within the
"target area" of the lessee's block booking operation, even though the
receipts from the distributed films determined the rent payable. The
target area was found to comprise only the lessee's competitors and
those forced to accept his films. The Supreme Court has indicated in
dicta that the only requisite for standing should be proof that the
plaintiff was injured by an antitrust violation. 20 The Court, however, has
(supplier of raw milk may recover for injury to distributor); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp.,
221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955) (manufacturer of car wax given standing to sue for injury to
distributor). In these cases, however, the courts did not repudiate the principle, but held that the
distributors were an inadequate force for carrying out the policy behind private enforcement of the
antitrust laws. The distributors were held to be merely formal entities whose existence would not bar
recovery by the party actually bearing the heaviest burden of loss. But see Billy Baxter, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970) (the existence of a distributor was a bar to standing for
a soft drink franchisor against a competing soft drink manufacturer).
14. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have followed the liberal policy of the Ninth Circuit.
E.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957).
15. 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956).
16. A similar case is Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957)
(lessor granted standing against violating lessee).
17. 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964).
18. 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953), affdper curiam, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 828 (1954).
19. 318 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'dper curiam, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970).
20. The Court, in granting standing under established precedent, indicated that present lower
court standing tests may be unduly restrictive. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People's Gas, Light, & Coke
Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961) (manufacturer of gas appliances may maintain action against
1971]
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never overturned the restrictive decisions denying standing to those
suffering injury as a result of their economic dependence on violators."1
The instant court dismissed at the outset the defendant's contention
that his breach of contract and not the antitrust violation was the legal
cause of the plaintiff's injury. The court found it immaterial whether the
block booking was a breach of contract, observing that successful
maintenance of an antitrust suit does not depend on the availability of a
common law remedy for the wrong. Turning to the defendant's standing
argument, the court concluded that the plaintiff's claim met the
requirements of the "target area" test currently utilized in that circuit.
The court reasoned that the defendant's activities did not have to be
"aimed at" the plaintiff in order for the target area test to be met. The
test is satisfied if it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would be
affected by the illegal activity, and if in fact he was "squarely hit." Since
it was entirely foreseeable that defendant's block booking could impair
the revenue producing potential of plaintiff's films, the court held that
the plaintiff had standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
At first glance, the instant decision appears to do no more than
extend the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of "target area" to include the
vendor-vendee relationship. 2 Thus, this liberal approach to standing
questions apparently is still confined to plaintiffs who are economically
dependent on the antitrust violator and is not applicable to situations in
which the plaintiff is dependent on a victim of the violation. Although
logical in the light of precedent, the decision is undesirable both for its
reasoning and its possible long-range impact. In applying the "target
area" test, the court gave this judicial metaphor a new and curious
reading. In earlier Ninth Circuit cases, the inquiry had been whether the
plaintiff had been "aimed at."' ' If so, he was in the "target area" and,
therefore, was granted standing. The lower court in the instant case,
relying on these decisions, had denied standing because it found that the
supplier who refused to deal with plaintiff); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445,
454 (1957) (blacklisted football player may sue organization of football teams).
21. See, e.g., Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 890 (1956) (lessor does not have standing against violating lessee). But see South Carolina
Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934
(1966) (Supreme Court refused to overturn a liberal standing decision).
22. The extension of standing to the lessor-lessee relationship preceded the instant decision in
the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.
1956).
23. E.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir. 1964);
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955). For a discussion of the "aimed
at" test for standing see Pollock, The "'Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage
Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 691,704 (1963).
[Vol. 24
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plaintiff was not "aimed at" by defendant's violation. The instant court,
however, concluded that it was immaterial that the plaintiff had not been
"aimed at" since he was "squarely hit," not "sideswiped nor struck by
a carom shot. ' 24 It is submitted that this reasoning further clouds an
already confused area and that the court has announced a standard that
will be exceedingly difficult to apply uniformly and with fairness. Even
more troublesome, however, is the court's conclusion that the plaintiff
was in the "target area" because it was reasonably foreseeable that he
would be injured by defendant's violation. This approach, if followed,
can only lead to further conflicts among the circuits. Moreover, it will
contravene the policy underlying the treble damage remedy. If this
reasoning is carried to its logical extent, standing will be granted to
plaintiffs who are dependent on victims of antitrust violations. It is
reasonably foreseeable, for example, that a shareholder's investment will
suffer if the corporation's profits are diminished by a restraint of trade.
Similarly, a creditor will likely sustain economic injury if his debtor is
forced into bankruptcy by an antitrust violation. A "reasonably
foreseeable" test would grant standing and, consequently, treble
damages to shareholders and creditors in these cases. It is submitted that
this result is clearly undesirable. The congressional purpose in enacting
section 4 of the Clayton Act was to supplement the efforts of the
Department of Justice to ensure competitive conditions in the economy. 2
Suits by plaintiffs whose causes of action are only derivative are
unnecessary to effectuate this policy.26 The individual who is directly
injured by the antitrust violation is not only the proper party to bring the
action, but his recovery also will benefit those indirectly affected by the
violation. Moreover, it would be unjust to permit all derivative plaintiffs
to recover a treble damage windfall. For these reasons, the instant
decision must be viewed as an undesirable and unwarranted relaxation of
standing requirements in treble damage actions. On the other hand, this
additional dimension to the conflict among the circuits could have a
desirable effect. Since the Second Circuit, in Fields Productions, Inc.,27
24. 433 F.2d at 1076.
25. The courts have repeatedly emphasized that § 4 was intended not merely to redress a
personal injury, but to aid in achieving the broader purposes of the antitrust laws. See, e.g.,
Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 214 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
912 (1955); Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943); see Note,
Standing To Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 570,
571 (1964).
26. For an extended discussion of this point see Note, The Franchisor As Plaintiff in Treble
Damage Actions: An Antitrust Anomaly, 49 B.U.L. REv. 322, 339-44 (1969).
27. Note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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reached the opposite result on almost identical facts, the conflict is now
more sharply focused than ever. It would seem, therefore, that a
Supreme Court clarification, avoided in the past, 28 is now almost
mandatory.
Constitutional Law-Free Exercise of Religion-First
Amendment Violated by Compulsory Education Statute
that Prevents a Parent from Raising His Children
According to His Religious Beliefs
Defendant,' a member of the Old Order Amish religion, 2 was
convicted of violating Wisconsin's Compulsory School Attendance Act,
3
which requires parents to insure regular school attendance of all children
under their control from ages seven to sixteen. At his trial, defendant
contended that by refusing to enroll his child in a public high school,4 he
was following the fundamental tenets of the Amish religion, which
consider a child's attendance in a public or private high school a
deterrent to salvation. 5 Defendant maintained, therefore, that the statute
28. Cases cited note 21 supra.
1. Three prosecutions were joined for hearing: State v. Yoder, No. 92 (member of Old Order
Amish religion); State v. Yutzy, No. 93 (member of Old Order Amish religion); and State v. Miller,
No. 94 (member of Conservative Amish Mennonite Church).
2. The Amish religion was formed in 1693 when Jakob Ammann separated from the Swiss
Anabaptists because of disagreements over what he believed to be unwarranted departures from the
traditional practices. In the 18th century the Amish migrated to America and settled in
Pennsylvania. Today, the Amish are found in most states, and there are large Amish communities in
Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. The Old Order Amish is the most conservative
sect and numbers about 50,000. See generally J. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY (1963); W.
SCHREIBER, OUR AMISH NEIGHBORS (1962); E. SMITH, THE AMISH PEOPiL (1958); Note, The Right
Not To Be Modern Men: The Amish and Compulsory Education, 53 VA. L. REV. 925 (1967).
3. The statute under which the defendants were convicted is substantially the same as the
present one. Wis. STAT. ANN. § I18.15(1)(a) (Spec. Pamphlet 1970) provides: "Unless the child
has a legal excuse or has graduated from high school, any person having under his control a child
who is between the ages of 7 and 16 years shall cause such child to attend school regularly during the
full period and hours, religious holidays excepted, that.the public or private school in which such
child should be enrolled is in session until the end of the school term, quarter or semester of the
school year in which he becomes 16 years of age."
4. The children had attended public schools until they had finished the eighth grade.
5. Strictly adhering to the agrarian traditions of their forefathers, the Amish place no value in
education beyond the eighth grade. The Amish teach their children to read and write in both
German and English and to learn basic mathematics. Education past the eighth grade is directed
toward farming, homemaking, or religious instruction. The high school years of Amish youth are
particularly critical, because they must decide at age 18, whether they will remain in the Amish
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violated his first amendment right to free exercise of his religion by
denying him the ability to raise his children in the Amish tradition.6 The
State contended that the statute's infringement of religious liberty was
justified by the State's interest in educating its youth. 7 Persuaded by the
State's contention, the circuit court affirmed the defendant's conviction.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,8 held, reversed. A
compulsory education statute that prevents a parent from raising his
children according to his religious beliefs violates the free exercise clause
of the first amendment. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539
(1971), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S. April 1, 1971) (No.
1536).
The religious liberty protected by the free exercise clause of the first
amendment has traditionally been limited.' In the early case of Reynolds
v. United States, 10 for example, the Supreme Court significantly
restricted the protection of the free exercise clause by distinguishing
Order and accept adult baptism. When Amish youth are between ages 14 and 18, they are imparted
with the cultural values of the Amish, and influences of a public high school severely hamper this
process. See Casad, Compulsory High School Attendance and the Old Order Amish: A
Commentary on State v. Garber, 16 KAN. L. REV. 423,425-26 (1968); Note, supra note 2.
6. The Amish fathers also contended that a high school education was irrelevant to the Amish
society. The cultural values of personal achievement and individual competition are inimical to
those values taught by the Amish. Casad, supra note 5, at 426-27; Note, supra note 2. The Amish
interpret the Bible literally and believe the scriptures, like the following, require that they remain
separated from the rest of the world: "Be not conformed to this world, but be ye transformed by the
renewing of your mind that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of
God," Romans 12:2; and "[b]e ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for what
fellowship hath righteous with unrighteous? and what communion hath light with darkness?" 2
Corinthians 6:14. These scriptures form the basic tenets of the Amish religion.
7. The State advanced 4 theories upon which the statute could be applied to the Amish. First,
the State contended that the first amendment protects only religious rituals, not a practice or way of
life. Secondly, the State, as parens patriae, could oversee the welfare of the defendant's children and
apply regulations to the children that would be unreasonable if applied to adults. Thirdly, an
exemption of the Amish would deny the purpose of the statute, which is to homogenize the State's
citizens. Lastly, an exemption of the Amish would violate the establishment clause of the first
amendment.
8. As complete pacifists, the Amish do not defend themselves in litigation. The appeal for the
defendants was initiated by the National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 16, 1971, at 37, col. 3.
9. For a discussion of the various freedoms contained in and restraints applied to the religion
clauses of the first amendment see Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning
Point, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 217, and Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development, Part I: The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1967).
10. 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (statute proscribing Mormon polygamy does not violate the free
exercise clause of the first amendment); accord, Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946)
(Mormon religious beliefs are not valid defenses against prosecutions under the Mann Act); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (statute imposing civil disabilities upon polygamists does not violate
the first amendment). But see Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 806,
824-26 (1958).
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between the right of an individual to hold a religious belief and the right
to practice that belief." The Court recognized that the right to hold a
religious belief was absolute 2 but held that the practice of a belief could
be controlled through the police powers of the state to protect the
health, 3 safety,' 4 and morals'5 of its citizens. The Supreme Court
subsequently recognized the inadequacy of this belief-practice
dichotomy as a test for determining the constitutionality of state
limitations on the free exercise clause. 6 In Sherbert v. Verner,17 the
Court announced a new test whereby the burden imposed on an
individual because of a restriction on the free exercise of his religion is
balanced against the state's interest in controlling the individual's
practice of his religion.' 8 In applying this weighing process, courts have
insisted that a compelling state interest be demonstrated before a state
may constitutionally limit the free exercise of religion. 9 In this regard, a
11. 98 U.S. at 163; see Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (advertisement of religious literature may be regulated); Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d
966 (8th Cir. 1969) (prison authorities need not permit dangerous inmates to attend Sunday
worship); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968) (obtaining and transfering
marijuana and LSD is not permissible as an exercise of religious beliefs).
12. 98 U.S. at 164; accord, United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (courts may not
consider the truth of religious beliefs); Supple v. Hallinan, 247 Cal. App. 2d 410, 55 Cal. Rptr. 542,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1966) (statements of church representative may not be challenged on
their basis of truth); see Weiss, Privilege. Posture and Protection: "'Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE
L.J. 593 (1964).
13. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding constitutionality of
compulsory vaccination requirements); People v. Handzik, 410 I11. 295, 102 N.E.2d 340 (1951).
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952) (criminal prosecution of faith healers upheld); McCartney v.
Austin, 57 Misc. 2d 525, 293 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (state can compel polio shots); State v.
Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966) (denying college student's claims of religious liberty
in possession marijuana and peyote).
14. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state's interest in regulating child labor is
paramount to religious beliefs); People v. Woodruff, 26 App. Div. 2d 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966)
(affirming contempt conviction for refusing to testify before a grand jury because of religious
beliefs); State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dismissed sub. nom. Bunn v. North
Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949) (handling of reptiles in religious ceremonies prohibited).
15. State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966) (affirming college student's
conviction for possessing marijuana and peyote); see People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d
813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (permitting use of peyote during ceremonies of Indian religion).
16. Galanter, supra note 9, at 236-37 (discussing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940), which reversed a breach of peace conviction that violated free exercise clause of first
amendment).
17. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (upholding a right to receive unemployment compensation even
though the applicant refused employment requiring Saturday work because it was contrary to her
religious beliefs).
18. 374 U.S. at 403; cf NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (the interest of union
members in receiving adequate legal representation outweighed the state's interest in proscribing the
conflict of interest when a union-paid attorney represents the union members).
19. E.g., Shelden v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963) (children cannot be compelled
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number of decisions have recognized the states' deep interest in
providing for minimum educational requirements as a means of
nurturing political awareness, economic productivity, and homogeneous
cultural values." On the other hand, a parent has an absolute right to
raise his children within his religion and to educate them in parochial
schools. 21 This right, however, is a limited one since the state may
regulate the standard of education afforded children at parochial
schools.2 2 Upholding this regulatory power, the Supreme Court of
Kansas, in State v. Garber,2 held that an Amish school must meet the
minimum standards of the state. Although this decision was later
effectively overruled by the Kansas legislature,24 all cases in which Amish
have refused to comply with compulsory education statutes have been
similarly decided by appellate courts. 25 In the absence of statutory
exemptions, therefore, courts have uniformly upheld state compulsory
education statutes notwithstanding their possible infringement of
religious liberty.
In the instant case, the court applied the Sherbert test and balanced
to stand during singing of the National Anthem when contrary to their religious beliefs); In re
Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963) (exception from jury duty for religious beliefs).
20. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168
Pa. Super. 462, 465, 79 A.2d 134, 137 (1951); Commonwealth v. Bey, 166 Pa. Super. 136, 70 A.2d
693 (1950). For a discussion of the state's interests in educating its youth see Scalise, The Amish in
Iowa and Teacher Certification. 31 ALBANY L. REV. 1 (1967). Most states have compulsory
education statutes. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 26-1 to -II (Smith-Hurd 1961); IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 28-505 to -517 (1948), as amended, (Supp. 1968); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 299.1-23
(1946), as amended, (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111 (Supp. 1970); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 15.3733-.3743 (1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3321.01-.13 (Baldwin 1964), as
amended, (Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1326 to -1334 (1962), as amended, (Supp.
1970).
21. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). This proposition has been well
established today and most of the present litigation concerns the standard of education which the
child is receiving and whether that standard meets the various exemption requirements. See notes 22
& 30 infra.
22. States may prescribe the number of class hours, the subjects taught, and the training
given to the teachers. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Morton v. Board of Educ.,
69 II. App. 2d 38, 216 N.E.2d 305 (1966); State v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252
(Morris County Ct., L. Div. 1967). See note 31 infra and accompanying text.
23. 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966).
24. The Kansas legislation created a religious exemption. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111
(Supp. 1970); see Casad, supra note 5, at 423. Other states also have created religious exemptions.
E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 299.24 (Supp. 1971). In Indiana, an administrative exemption was
granted to the Amish. 28 Ops. IND. Ar'y GEN. 140 (1959).
25. E.g., State v. Hershberger, 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955); Commonwealth
v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951). Only one court has held in favor of the Amish,
Commonwealth v. Petersheim, 70 Pa. D.&C. 432 (Somerset County Ct. 1949), but this decision was
effectively overruled by Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951). See
Note, supra note 2, at 945-48.
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the burden placed on the defendant's free exercise of his religion against
the State's interest in compulsory education. Reasoning that the statute
subjected Amish children to an anguish of living in two cultures and
forced their parents to choose between damnation and criminal sanction,
the court found that a severe burden was placed on the defendant in the
exercise of his religion."5 Turning to the State's interest, the court found
that the welfare of the Amish children was not enhanced by the
compulsory education statute and that the purpose of the statute would
not be materially compromised by exempting the Amish.2 1 The court
concluded that. the statute was not grounded upon a sufficiently
compelling interest and, therefore, violated the first amendment right of
the Amish to the free exercise of their religion.2 A dissenting judge
reasoned that education is a compelling interest of the state that conflicts
with the constitutional rights of the Amishl and suggested that the
antangonistic interests be reconciled by requiring the Amish to establish
their own vocational schools.30
By expanding the scope of first amendment protection of religious
liberty, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has become the first appellate
tribunal to exempt the Amish from a compulsory school attendance
statute. In predicating its exemption upon the first amendment, the court
has implicitly accepted two propositions: first, that securing for Amish
26. The court found that the statute required the defendants "to perform affirmative acts
which are repugnant to their religion." State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539, 542
(1971).
27. The court also rejected each of the theories upon which the state was defending the statute.
See note 9 supra. In particular, the court stated that its decision would not violate the establishment
clause of the first amendment because a special exemption for the Amish would do nothing more
than relieve the direct burdens placed on the Amish by the government regulation. Thus the court is
remaining "neutral" by accommodating religious variations. 182 N.W.2d at 545; accord, Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding constitutionality of tax exemption for religious
property); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down prayer in public
schools).
28. In distinguishing earlier decisions limiting religious liberty, the court found that either a
different state interest was involved or the burden upon the individual's exercise of his religion was
not as severe as in the instant case. 182 N.W.2d at 544-45. A concurring opinion advocated limit-
ing the constitutional exemption from the statute to those children living as members of an Old
Order Amish religion or Conservative Amish Mennonite Church community.
29. 182 N.W.2d at 547 (Hefferman, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued that Amish
children should be compelled to attend high school in order to protect those who may choose to
leave the Order.
30. The establishment of Amish vocational schools would not resolve the conflict, but would
place it on a different level. The conflict would no longer be one of attendance, but would become
one of teacher certification and the quality of the education taught in the Amish schools. Where
Amish communities have established their own schools, they have generally failed to meet minimum
state requirements. For a discussion of the problems with Amish schools in a state where the Amish
have been vigorously prosecuted see Scalise, supra note 20.
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parents the right to prevent their children from attending high school
does not abridge any paramount rights of the children, and secondly,
that a minority culture has the right to resist ingestion by a majority
culture. These two propositions warrant independent discussion and
analysis.
In considering the first proposition, the majority observed that
there was no conflict of interests in the instant case between the parent
and his child since they shared a mutual disdain for public high school.3 1
A conflict could exist, however, if a child's religious interests were
restricted by the parent. 32 To treat this conflict, one must first determine
the extent to which a parent can influence the religious choice of his
children. In this regard, it is not uncommon for parents to raise children
with the belief and expectation that they will continue to adhere to the
religious tenets taught them in childhood. Moreover, the exclusiveness
and intensity of a child's religious instruction has long been an incident
of parental discretion. The first amendment should not be construed
therefore, to afford every child a right to be introduced to a maximum
number of faiths from which to choose. The Constitution guarantees
only that once a choice has been made, the individual shall have the free
exercise of his chosen religion protected.3 A significant aspect of the
Amish parent's free exercise of his chosen religion is his ability to raise
his children within that religion. Thus, the control of parents over the
religious instruction of their children is their constitutionally protected
right 34 and does not violate their children's religious liberty. Difficulty
arises, however, when the exercise of the parent's religion affects more
than the mere religious interest of the child. In these instances, the
religious liberty of the parent must be balanced against the potential
nonreligious harm to the child. When the religious belief of the parent
threatens the health or safety of the child, for example, the state may
31. See 182 N.W.2d at 542.
32. Since the Amish children have the right to choose and practice a religion upon reaching
the age of majority, this conflict would be restricted to the parent and his minor children. 182
N.W.2d at 543. In regard to the ultimate choice of the child, the majority felt that a state should
not be permitted to "directly influence or destroy that choice." 182 N.W.2d at 543.
33. In asserting the interest of Amish youth, the argument could have been made that the first
amendment, by protecting both free speech and the free exercise of religion, suggests a purpose to
insure the free flow of ideas, and, therefore, the free exercise clause was not meant to protect a
religion, such as the Amish, designed to eliminate a child's exposure to a free flow of ideas. In this
regard, the effect of the state's argument in the instant case would be to manipulate the choices open
to a child and not to secure the total free flow of ideas. While new possible choices would be created
by exposure to cultural values of the majority in public high school, the choice of entering the
Amish Order would be eliminated as a possibility. See notes 6 & 27 supra and accompanying text.
34. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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prescribe actions repugnant to the parent's religion.3s The only children
who are threatened with potential nonreligious harm under the ruling of
the instant case are those who, upon reaching majority, may seek their
livelihood outside of the Amish Order. 36 It is submitted, however, that a
mere postponement of high school education would not sufficiently
harm those children who will leave the Order to warrant restricting the
parents' religious liberty, and jeopardizing the religious instruction of
those children who will remain within the Order.
In reference to the second proposition assumed by the instant
decision-that a minority culture may resist ingestion by a majority
culture-the court apparently recognized that the perpetuation of the
Amish culture depends upon the ability of parents to instill their cultural
values into their children. By requiring a high school education, the state
could effectively disrupt the parents' instruction of their children, cause
the Amish children to reject the Amish values,3 7 and threaten the Order
with extinction. 38 These possible consequences cast particular
significance upon the determination of whether the state could impose on
the child values that are repugnant to the religious values of the parent.
In resolving this issue the court relied upon a value that overrides the
educational values advanced by the state-the first amendment
guarantee of free exercise of one's religion.3 9 By upholding the religious
liberty of the Amish parents, the court insured the preservation of the
Amish religion on the basis of a state and not an Amish value. In effect,
the court concluded that a minority may resist ingestion by a majority
35. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text. The majority opinion in the instant case
also points out that these remedial measures to protect the child are far less harmful to other
religions than compulsory education is to the Amish religion. 182 N.W.2d at 544-45. This reason-
ing would suggest that even if the rights of the parent were in direct conflict with those of the child
concerning education, the balance of the rights rests with the parent.
36. The youth choosing to remain within the Amish Order do not need a high school
education, and to compel them to attend high school would be detrimental to their exercise of the
Amish religion.
37. Both the majority and dissenting opinions expressed the view that a central purpose of
education was to "awaken" the children to the cultural values of the state. 182 N.W.2d at 543, 548.
Both cited Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as support for the proposition. The
defendants in the instant case were objecting to this "awakening" process. Furthermore, Brown
was inapposite to the instant case, because in Brown a minority culture was seeking entry into the
majority culture, not rejecting it.
38. 182 N.W.2d at 542. If a high school education influences youth to reject the Amish
religion, and if the Amish are unable to reside in an area where they are granted relief from these
prosecutions, then the religion would lose its members, or prospective members, until none
remained.
39. "No liberty guaranteed by our constitution is more important or vital to our free society
than is a religious liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." 182
N.W.2d at 540. See also Galanter, supra note 9; Giannella, supra note 9.
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culture40 if it can demonstrate that imposition of majority values will
impair its religious liberty. It is submitted that this result is a proper one,
since the free exercise clause of the first amendment should be construed
as guaranteeing every individual the maximum opportunity to adhere to
the dictates of his conscience. 1
Constitutional Law-Immunity Statutes-Section 201 of
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Which Provides
Only Use and Fruits Immunity, Violates Fifth
Amendment
The United States Government applied to federal district court for
an order compelling a witness' to testify under a grant of immunity
afforded by section 201 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.2
40. One author aptly describes the problem in these words: "As government exercises control
over more aspects of the environment, it becomes more difficult for a minority to opt out of the
system or to form an enclave beyond its reach." Galanter, supra note 9, at 268. A California court
suggests one viewpoint: "In a mass society, which presses at every point toward conformity, the
protection of a self-expression, however unique, of the individual and the group becomes ever more
important. The varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our national life
give it depth and beauty." People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727, 394 P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69,77 (1964).
41. Cf. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (conscientious objection exemption
applies to sincerely held personal philosophies); In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 912 (1964) (self-styled peyote preacher permitted to use peyote for religious purposes). But cf
Commonwealth v. Renfrew, 332 Mass. 492, 126 N.E.2d 109 (1955) (Buddhist parents may not keep
child at home to protect him from Christian religion); People ex rel. Shapiro v. Dorin, 199 Misc.
643,99 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950), affd mem. sub nom., People v. Donner, 302 N.Y. 857,
100 N.E.2d 48, appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 884 (1951) (state interest paramount to unique
interpretation of Jewish law); Commonwealth ex rel. School Dist. v. Bey, 166 Pa. Super. 136, 70
A.2d 693 (1950) (Moslem parent cannot keep child from school on their Friday sabbath).
I. Joanne Kinoy refused to testify before a federal grand jury despite a grant of immunity
providing that "no testimony or other information compelled under the order, or any information,
may be used against Joanne Kinoy in any criminal case. ... In re Kinoy's Testimony, No.
M- 11-28 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1971), substantially reported in 8 CRIM. L. REP. 2327.
2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (1971) provides: "Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or
ancillary to-(l) a court or grand jury of the United States, (2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses or a committee or a
subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the
witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled
under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order." (emphasis added).
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 24
The witness had refused to testify, asserting3 that because section 201 did
not offer transactional immunity, 4 it was not coextensive with her fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination 5 and was therefore
unconstitutional. The witness predicated this argument on the early
Supreme Court decision of Counselman v. Hitchcock.' The United
States District Attorney contended that section 201's insulation solely
from the use and fruits of testimony was sufficient to satisfy fifth
amendment requirements. In support of this contention, the Government
argued, on the one hand, that the portions of the Counselman decision
relied on by the witness were dicta and, alternatively, that Counselman
had been implicitly overruled by a more recent Supreme Court decision.
7
Rejecting the Government's position, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, held, order denied. An immunity
statute that does not grant transactional immunity from prosecution is
unconstitutional under the fifth amendment. In re Kinoy's Testimony,
No. M-11-28 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1971).
Constitutional requirements for statutes that compel self-
incriminating testimony were first articulated by the Supreme Court in
1892 in Counselman v. Hitchcock.' In that case, the Court stated that in
order to deprive a witness of his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination, a statute must grant "absolute immunity against future
prosecution for the offense to which the [compelled testimony] relates."'
3. In addition to the witness's main contention, she also profferred the following defenses: (1)
that she must be under grand jury subpoena outlining the scope and subject matter of the
investigation or be asked a definite question before being coerced to testify under immunity;
otherwise the court would be required to grant her indefinite prospective immunity for any crime to
which her testimony might relate; (2) that the abstruse generality and failure of the order to specify
the exact questions she would be required to answer violated the notice requirement of the due
process clause; and (3) that the testimony sought did not further a legitimate grand jury
investigation.
4. Transactional immunity may be defined as absolute or complete immunity from future
prosecution for the crime to which the question relates. Immunity from prosecution obviously
encompasses the lesser degrees of immunity from (1) the use of the immunized testimony and (2) the
fruits or indirect consequences that flow from the testimony. See notes 9 & 10 infra and
accompanying text.
5. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself .. " U.S. CoNrsT. amend. V.
6. 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (a witness must receive full transactional immunity to replace the fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination).
7. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Habor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
8. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
9. Id. at 586. In Counselman, the Court held that an immunity statute that leaves the party or
witness subject to prosecution after he answers an incriminating question cannot have the effect of
supplanting the fifth amendment privilege. The statute is valid only if it supplies complete protection
from all perils against which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard.
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This requirement, which has come to be known as the "transactional
immunity" standard, demands that an immunity statute accord a
witness protection coextensive with his fifth amendment privilege
usurped by the compulsion of testimony. The standard enunciated in
Counselman "0 was followed unwaveringly by the judiciary for more than
70 years." As recently as 1956, the Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed
the pre-eminence of this standard and commanded strict adherence by
federal immunity statutes. 2 Congress, moreover, accepted the standard
as law, and until 1964 virtually all federal immunity legislation rigidly
complied with the Counselman mandate of transactional protection. 3 In
the 1964 case of Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Har-
bor,4 however, the Supreme Court seemed to depart from the Counsel-
man rule in sustaining a state immunity statute that afforded transac-
tional immunity within the state augmented by constitutionally-founded
federal use and fruits immunity without requiring immunity from future
federal prosecution. The Court's foremost concern in Murphy was not
with the specific statute in issue,' 5 but rather with abolishing the archaic
"two sovereignties rule," which required only that the immunizing state
or federal statute afford immunity within its respective sphere of
operation. The Murphy decision immediately generated prodigious
10. The standard promulgated in Counselman was reiterated 4 years later by the Supreme
Court in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). The Brown decision, in upholding a statute
obviously patterned after the holding in Counselman, solidified the Counselman standard as settled
judicial doctrine. The immunity statute challenged in Brown provided: "[N]o person shall be
prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or
thing concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said
Commission, or in obedience to its subpoena. ... 161 U.S. at 594.
!1. Until Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the
Court rigidly adhered to the Counselman ruling. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941);
Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
12. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). "[lI]n Counselrnan . . . a
unanimous Court had found constitutionally inadequate the predecessor to the 1893 statute because
the immunity granted was incomplete, in that it merely forbade the use of the testimony given and
failed to protect a witness from future prosecution based on knowledge and sources of information
obtained from the compelled testimony." Id. at 436-37.
13. See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
14. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). "[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not
be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled
testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a
criminal prosecution against him." Id. at 79.
15. On the same day that the Murphy decision was handed down, the Court decided Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), which held that the fifth amendment's protection against compulsory
self-incrimination is binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment. Although the statute
involved in Murphy technically complied with the "two sovereignties rule," the Court used this
statute as a vehicle to vitiate the anomalous effects of the rule and to further extend the
constitutional strictures enunciated in Malloy.
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judicial and legislative speculation about whether it has overruled
Counselman sub silentio and established a new standard for gauging the
validity of immunity statutes.16 One year later in Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Board,17 the Court attempted to quell the uncertainty
by reiterating the Counselman precept that "no immunity statute which
leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the
criminating question" will withstand the censorship of the fifth
amendment. 8 Unfortunately, however, the confusion was far from
clarified. In 1968, the Supreme Court resurrected the dormant dispute
when it indicated in five cases that statutory use and fruits immunity
might be sufficient to placate fifth amendment strictures. 9 Perhaps in an
attempt to resolve the quandary, and to centralize disparate federal
statutory provisions, Congress hurriedly enacted section 201 of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, comprehensively repealing the
existing 57 federal immunity statutes.20 In deference to a burgeoning
wave of public concern over the disruptive force of organized crime,
section 201 was patterned strictly after the holding in Murphy and made
no provision for transactional immunity as required in Counselman.
2
1
After summarily disposing of several peripheral issues,22 the instant
16. See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1188, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 39-45 (1970); S. REp. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. Doc. No. 105, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969); Hearings on H.R. 11157 and 12041 Before Subcomm. 3 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30)
or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NoTRE DAME LAW. 55, 83-84 (1970); Wendel,
Compulsory Immunity Legislation and Fifth Amendment Privilege: New Developments and New
Confusion, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 327 (1966); 116 CONG. REc. S481 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1970)
(remarks of Senator Williams); 116 CONG. REC. S422-26 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1970) (letter from the
American Civil Liberties Union to each member of the Senate).
17. 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
18. Id. at 80. The Court subsequently reaffirmed its stance taken in Albertson in Stevens v.
Marks, 383 U.S. 234 (1966). The Court stated that although the issue had not been raised anew in
the Stevens case, Counselman irrefutably remained the standard. The Court then cited Albertson as
the most recent echo of the standard. Id. at 244-45.
19. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968);
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Grosso v.
United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). The Court was
not forced to reach the question of transactional immunity in these cases, however, since all the
statutes failed to provide the more fundamental requirement of protection from the use and fruits of
the testimony.
20. For a catalogue of the 57 federal immunity statutes repealed by § 201 see the listing
following Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 201, 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (Supp. 1971).
21. See H.R. REp. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The Ninth Circuit has recently
upheld the constitutionality of § 201 in a decision reflecting almost exclusive reliance on the
standard interpretation of Murphy. Stewart v. United States, 9 CRIM. L. RPrR. 2021 (9th Cir.,
Mar. 29, 1971). See also note 33 infra.
22. See note 3 supra.
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court considered the salient question whether the protection afforded by
section 201 was coextensive with the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination. Addressing the Government's contention that the
transactional immunity requirement of Counselman was mere dictum,2
3
the court observed that even if this were originally the case, supervening
Supreme Court decisions24 had elevated the requirement to binding
judicial doctrine. Turning to the Government's second argument, that
Counselman had been overruled sub silentio by the Murphy decision, the
court intimated that there was clearly a basis upon which the two
decisions were distinguishable. Specifically, the court pointed out that,
unlike Counselman, Murphy had focused on a state statute that
provided immunity from future state prosecution coupled with
constitutionally-based federal use and fruits immunity, but did not
shield against future federal prosecution.?- The court further noted that
the Murphy Court, in dissolving the inveterate "two sovereignties
rule, ' 2 6 had not directly confronted the question whether federal
immunity statutes must afford transactional insulation. Thus the court
held that the Counselman standard is still vital,2 and that since section
201-which closely resembled the enactment invalidated in
Counselman-failed to extend transactional immunity it violated the
fifth amendment.
It seems clear from the instant decision that the Murphy Court
wisely declined to overrule Counselman. If Murphy were to represent a
relaxed constitutional standard under which immunity from prosecution
is no longer required fifth amendment rights would be emasculated. As a
consequence a witness would inevitably be forced to make the impossible
choice between a contempt citation and self-inculpation.28 Moreover,
had the Supreme Court intended to overrule Counselman, it would not
23. The court further stated that those who argued prior to 1956 that the Supreme Court's
language in Counselman was mere dictum were abruptly silenced by the Court's decision, directly
in point, in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). In Ullmann the Court ruled 7 to 2 in
favor of the Counselman standard. See also note II supra.
24. See notes 10 & I I supra.
25. 378 U.S. at 79.
26. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
27. The court further demonstrated that in 2 cases subsequent to Murphy, the Supreme Court
had reiterated the Counselman requirements, so that Murphy could not have enunciated a new test,
or it would have been followed in all subsequent litigation. See Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234
(1966); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
28. The usual criminal sanction for refusal to testify is ajudicial contempt citation. A witness
who has been granted immunity only from the use and fruits of his testimony would still be subject
to prosecution for the related offense. Thus, he would be forced to elect either to remain silent and be
sentenced to jail for as much as 18 months for contempt, or to testify and risk the possibility of
prosecution.
1971]
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
have unequivocally restated the transactional immunity mandate only a
year after the Murphy decision was rendered.29 Assuming that the
Counselman rule has always been the correct standard, there are two
possible bases upon which Murphy can be explained logically. The first
explanation, which has been suggested by several scholars,3" is that Mr.
Justice Goldberg's majority opinion in Murphy, in a zealous attempt to
abolish the "two sovereignties rule," inadvertently failed to require that
a state witness be afforded immunity from federal prosecution. This
view, 3' however, is fatally discredited by Justices White and Stewart's
extended concurring opinion which reveals the majority's overt intention
to omit the requirement of federal transactional immunity when the state
is the immunizing body. A second explanation for the Murphy decision
was offered in the instant case-that Murphy is in fact distinguishable
from Counselman. As the instant court correctly intimates, Murphy was
directed primarily toward the dissolution of the "two sovereignties rule"
and did not specifically consider whether federal immunity statutes must
offer transactional protection.3 2 The proponents of section 201, however,
apparently attempted to extend the Murphy rationale to authorize the
enactment of a federal statute affording only use and fruits protection.3
Since this extension was obviously unwarranted, the instant court was
clearly justified in invalidating section 20134 solely on the basis of the
Counselman standard.
Even if the transactional immunity standard had been met in
section 201, there remains some question whether immunity statutes in
29. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79-80 (1965).
30. See materials cited note 16 supra.
31. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1188, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1970).
32. The Murphy Court was concerned because the state government would be able to
immunize a witness from federal prosecution. The Court, therefore, carved an exception in that
specific instance. The proponents of § 201, however, have interpreted Murphy to mean that the
federal government is not required to extend a witness immunity from state prosecution. Since the
Murphy exception applies only unilaterally, § 201 is unconstitutional. See text accompanying note
15 supra.
33. A recent case has held to the contrary. Stewart v. United States, 9 CRIm. L. RaP. 2021
(9th Cir., Mar. 29, 1971). The court relied exclusively upon the interpretation of Murphy
promulgated by proponents of § 201 without considering the fundamental distinction that the
statute involved in Murphy was a state statute, thereby restricting the Murphy Court's holding
because of sensitivity to federalism: "It appears that Murphy has decided the issue here both with
respect to the scope of Counselman and also with respect to the extent of the requirements of the
Fifth Amendment. ... 9 CRIM. L. REP. at 2021.
34. Prior to the instant decision, various federal administrative agencies had voiced strong
opposition to § 201 for failing to provide transactional immunity and, therefore, interfering with
their investigative functions. Objection had also been raised that personalized immunity statutes
serve their purposes better than a single uniform one. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 11157 & 12041
Before Subcomm. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 Ist Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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general are desirable. Under the Counselman standard, for example, a
state interrogating officer could injudiciously foreclose all future federal
prosecution of a witness for the specific offense to which his compelled
testimony relates. Moreover, once the witness has taken the stand under
a grant of immunity, the immunizing body must cautiously frame its
questions to avoid eliciting unexpected testimony to extraneous crimes
which might entitle the witness to a blanket "gift" of immunity. The
most inequitable effects of immunity statutes, however, may fall upon
the witness. Although a witness cannot be judicially prosecuted after
testifying under a grant of immunity, he may be "convicted" in public
opinion, losing employment and other vital benefits incidental to societal
favor. While a certain degree of guilt would be attached by public
suspicion even if the witness pleaded the fifth amendment, perhaps the
guilt from forced confession results in harsher tangential consequences.
If so, it appears that the witness should be permitted to elect to testify
under immunity or to reject the grant and remain vulnerable, since he
would otherwise be "convicted" in the public mind without due process
and since the Constitution extends him the privilege against self-
incrimination.
Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-AFDC
Caseworker's Visit to Home of Nonconsenting Welfare
Recipient Not Prohibited by Fourth Amendment
The New York City Department of Social Services initiated
proceedings to terminate plaintiff's Aid for Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) benefits because she refused to allow a caseworker to
visit her home.' Plaintiff thereupon instituted a class action2 seeking
1. Plaintiff had submitted to a home visit as a prerequisite to determining AFDC eligibility
and had permitted numerous follow-up visits. Although plaintiff refused to allow further visits, she
offered to meet with the caseworker at any other place and provide whatever information was
required. The Department of Social Services thereupon advised plaintiff that a quarterly home visit
was mandatory if aid was to continue. Subsequently, a hearing was held and the reviewing officer
determined that plaintiff's refusal to allow the visit was sufficient cause to terminate assistance.
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 322 n.9 (1971).
The AFDC program is financed largely by the federal government on a matching fund basis.
Congress, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the New York State Legislature, and
the New York City Department of Social Services all promulgate regulations affecting New York
City AFDC recipients. For discussions of pertinent AFDC regulations see 23 VAND. L. REv. 1390,
1391-92 (1970), and 79 YALE L.J. 746 (1970).
2. Plaintiff brought suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964),
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declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that the Department's
pplicy3 of mandatory home visits violates both the federal constitution
and HEW regulations.4 Plaintiff argued that the fourth amendment bans
all administrative searches of an individual's home unless the occupant's
consent or a search warrant is first obtained. Defendants, the New York
State and City Departments of Social Services, urged that since the
caseworker's visit is primarily rehabilitative in purpose, it is not a
search. In the alternative, defendant claimed that because of the essential
role of the home visit in the proper administration of the AFDC
program, it is not the kind of unreasonable intrusion proscribed by the
fourth amendment, even if it is characterized as a search. The three-judge
district court upheld plaintiff's constitutional claim. 5 On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Caseworker visits to
homes of nonconsenting welfare recipients that are conducted in a
reasonable manner and are not for the purpose of criminal investigation,
and that, if refused, result only in denial of AFDC assistance, are not
prohibited by the fourth amendment. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309
(1971).
In recent years, the Supreme Court has shown increasing
willingness to recognize in varying contexts a constitutional right of
privacy. In the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut,6 the Court
held that the marital relationship is safeguarded by the right to privacy.
Although not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court
found that the right emanates from the penumbra of the first, third,
fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. The Court also has held that the
privacy of an individual's home is entitled to protection against
in behalf of her son and all other AFDC recipients similarly situated. She also sought an injunction
prohibiting the Department from terminating AFDC payments.
3. N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 134 (McKinney 1966) requires that "[t]he public welfare
officials responsible . . . for investigating any application for public assistance and care, shall
maintain close contact with persons granted public assistance and care. Such persons shall be visited
as frequently as is provided by the rules of the board and/or regulations of the department or
required by the circumstances of the case .... " 18 STATE OF NEW YORK, CODES, RULES, &
REGULATIONS §§ 351.10, .21 (1962) requires that the caseworker visit the home of AFDC reci-
pients. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, POLICIES GOVERNING THE ADMINISTRATION OF
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE § 175 (1963) implements the statute and code by requiring "[mandatory
visits. . . at least once every three months ....
4. Plaintiff argued that HEW regulations prohibiting home visits without consent are
binding upon the states. See note 30 infra.
5. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The majority, finding that the
Department's scheme violated the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search and
seizures, declared the statute unconstitutional, and enjoined the Department from terminating
plaintiff's AFDC payments. The dissenting opinion argued that there was no search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 946 (McLean, J., dissenting).
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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unwanted mail,7 door-to-door salesmen," and electronic surveillance.'
The Court often has recognized that the fourth amendment's prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures is of central importance to the
right of privacy. 0 Although this constitutional safeguard traditionally
has been invoked to protect criminal defendants from overzealous law
enforcement officers," it is debatable whether the amendment had its
origin in criminal or civil law.' 2 In any event, the amendment's
applicability to searches by administrative officials was not tested for
almost a century after its enactment.' 3 Moreover, for many years the
Supreme Court seemed content to avoid the question. 4 The Court
7. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 735-36 (1970) (recipient's first
amendment right of privacy outweighs sender's freedom of speech and press).
8. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626-27, 632 (1951); cf. Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (dictum that homeowner has right to prevent distribution of unwanted
handbills, despite unconstitutionality of statute in question).
9. E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
10. E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961) (eavesdropping violates
fourth amendment right of privacy); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473-74 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (wiretapping as invasion of right of privacy); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 626-30 (1886) (search and seizure violates fourth amendment right of privacy); Beaney,
The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 253, 260-65 (1966).
II. E.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), noted in 23 VAND. L. REV. 1370 (1970);
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See
generally J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 49-61, 118-43 (1966);
Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, in 55 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
10643 (1937).
12. This ambiguity stems from conflicting interpretations of the prerevolutionary "writs of
assistance," frequently utilized by the Crown. It is unclear whether these writs are civil or criminal
in origin. There is no doubt that the fourth amendment's authors were primarily concerned with the
writ. A. CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3 (2d ed. 1930); J. LANDYNSKI, supra
note II, at 30-48; Lasson, supra note 11, at 51-78. The writ of assistance was used to combat the
colonists' penchant for smuggling to avoid unpopular duties. The writ conferred general authority
to search for violations of the law, and resulted in a fine and the forfeiture of any smuggled goods
unearthed. Although during that period forfeiture was considered a civil remedy, it would probably
be considered penal today. Comment, Administrative Inspection Procedures Under the Fourth
Amendment-Administrative Probable Cause, 32 ALBANY L. REV. 155, 156-57 (1967). From this
uncertainty flow strikingly diverse opinions regarding the purpose of the amendment. Compare In
re Strouse, 23 F. Cas. 261 (No. 13,548) (D. Nev. 1871) ("the fourth amendment. . . is applicable
to criminal cases only"), with District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1949), affd
on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950) ("in none of [the opinions interpreting the fourth amendment]
is there the slightest intimation that the right to privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment is
limited to persons or things involved in suspected crime").
13. The applicability of the amendment to administrative proceedings was first tested in 2
IRS cases. In re Meador, 16 F. Cas. 1294, 1298-99 (No. 9375) (N.D. Ga. 1869) (summons issued by
supervisor of IRS for production of business records not governed by fourth amendment); In re
Strouse, 23 F. Cas. 261, 262 (No. 13,548) (D. Nev. 1871) (IRS examination of business records not
prohibited by the fourth amendment).
14. The issue was first raised in the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S.
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eventually addressed the issue in Frank v. Maryland15 and upheld a
conviction for refusing to grant a health department inspector access to a
home. The Court held that the fourth amendment's protection extends
only to searches for evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution. 6 Less
than ten years later, however, the Court, in Camara v. Municipal
Court, 7 reversed a conviction for refusing to submit to a routine home
inspection by the city health department. The Court, explaining that a
search without a warrant is unreasonable in all but a few carefully
circumscribed situations,' held that a search of a private dwelling by an
administrative official falls within the fourth amendment's prohibition,
unless consented to or supported by a warrant based on probable cause.,9
In a companion case, See v. City of Seattle,"0 the Court extended its
newly formulated administrative search doctrine to business
establishments by overturning a defendant's conviction for refusing to
grant a fire inspector access to his warehouse. The See Court interpreted
Camara as holding that any warrantless search of a private dwelling is
presumptively unreasonable. 2' Notwithstanding these precedents, many
1 (1950). It has been said that the Court sidestepped the constitutional question with tortured
statutory interpretation. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 11, at 247-48.
15. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
16. The reasoning of the majority was bitterly attacked by the 4 dissenters in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Douglas. 359 U.S. at 374. Less than one month after the decision, the Court noted
probable jurisdiction in the similar case of Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959). Several
factors attending the Court's decision to take such a similar case so soon after Frank caused one
observer to speculate that the 4 justices who voted to consider the case did so to embarrass the
majority. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note I1, at 253-54. The justices noting jurisdiction were the
dissenters in Frank, and they knew that Mr. Justice Stewart, a member of the majority, would
recuse himself from consideration of the Ohio case since his father was on the court that decided the
case below. The 4 justices voting against noting jurisdiction wrote strong dissenting opinions, a
highly irregular practice. Since Mr. Justice Stewart recused himself, the defendant's conviction was
later sustained in a one sentence per curiam opinion by an evenly divided Court. Ohio ex rel Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
17. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The 4 dissenters in Frank, Justices Douglas, Black, and Brennan
and Chief Justice Warren, were joined by Justices White and Fortas to become the majority in
Camara.
18. A warrantless search is reasonable only if incident to a valid arrest (Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)) or if there is probable cause to suspect that an automobile containing
contraband might be removed (Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)). See J. LANDYNSKI,
supra note 1I, at 87-117.
19. 387 U.S. at 531. The Court indicated that "ft]he basic purpose of [the fourth
amendment] is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials." Id. at 528. In addition, the Court stated "[it is surely anomalous to say
that the invididual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when
the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Id. at 530.
20. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
21. Id. at 543. The Camara and See decisions were the subject of much discussion. See, e.g.,
Comment, supra note 12; 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 209 (1967); 52 MINN. L. REv.
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states have continued to require visitation by caseworkers to homes of
welfare recipients as a condition to AFDC assistance even though the
visits are neither consented to nor supported by a valid search warrant. 2
In some states, moreover, the caseworker is under a statutory duty to
report criminal violations detected during the visit. 23 Although
compulsory home visits to welfare recipients have been challenged on
other grounds, 24 no court has squarely faced the underlying
constitutional question.
The instant Court first acknowledged that, with few exceptions,
searches are prohibited by the fourth amendment unless consented to or
authorized by a valid warrant. The Court refused, however, to
characterize the caseworker's home visit as a "search" within the
meaning of that amendment. Although entering a welfare recipient's
home has an admittedly investigative as well as rehabilitative purpose,
the Court found the rehabilitative purpose to be of paramount
significance.Y The conclusive factor in the Court's reluctance to term the
caseworker's visit a search was the finding that no criminal sanction
threatened the welfare recipient who refused a home visit.26 The Court
further reasoned that even if the caseworker's intrusion were described as
a search, the procedure does not possess the character of
unreasonableness proscribed by the fourth amendment. The Court found
instead that the visits were not only conducted in a reasonable manner,
but also furthered legitimate state interests.27 Concluding that the
challenged visitation program threatened the plaintiff with neither an
761 (1968); 79 YALE L.J. 746 (1970). Much of the commentary assumed the fourth amendment was
applicable to administrative searches and concentrated on the lower probable cause standard for
issuing administrative warrants promulgated in Camara. 387 U.S. at 533-40.
22. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-131 (1960); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 110-9-7 (Supp.
1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1243
(1964); MIss. CODE ANN. § 7177 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-13 (1968); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 28-7-7 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.19(2)
(1957).
23. See note 36 infra; cf. Miss. CODE ANN. § 7174(i) (Supp. 1970).
24. E.g., Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1967) (state cannot condition receipt of benefits on submitting to midnight raids).
25. The majority bolstered its finding that the purpose of the visit was primarily rehabilitative
by quoting extensively from the Social Security Act, subch. IV, pt. A, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964),
as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (Supp. V, 1970) (authorizing the AFDC program). 400 U.S. at
315-16. The statute emphasizes that the focus of recipient-contact should be on rehabilitation rather
than investigation.
26. The Court indicated that "[i]f consent to the visitation is withheld, no visitation takes
place. The aid then never begins or merely ceases, as the case may be. There is no entry of the home
and there is no search." 400 U.S. at 317-18.
27. The Court found the visits were helpful in protecting children from abuse, preventing
fraud, and rehabilitating the recipient.
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unwarranted invasion of personal privacy nor the infringement of any
right protected by the fourth amendment, the Court upheld the
termination of plaintiff's AFDC benefits based on her refusal to permit
the caseworker to enter her home. 28 Mr. Justice Douglas, in his
dissenting opinion,29 argued that the fourth amendment affords
protection against all governmental intrusions, and, by forcing welfare
recipients to choose between consenting to the search and forfeiting
benefits, the state was conditioning receipt of its largess upon the
surrender of a constitutional right. Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting,
concluded that since the federal statutory provisions were dispositive of
the issue, it was unnecessary to decide the case on constitutional
grounds.3° He argued, moreover, that the majority had not only ignored
Camara's prohibition of warrantless administrative searches, but also
had created a special exception to fourth amendment protection that will
be felt most severely by the poor.
31
The instant decision severely curtails fourth amendment protection
against administrative searches and seizures. The Court's refusal to
characterize the caseworker's visit as a search in effect limits the
amendment's proscription to intrusions that are incident to criminal
proceedings.3 2 The frequently proferred view that Camara brought
warrantless administrative searches within the amendment's scope3 has
proved erroneous. Although the Court did not satisfactorily define the
class of permissible intrusions, both the reasoning and language of the
majority opinion indicate that this newly created exception to fourth
amendment protection may be broad. The Court concluded, for
example, that Camara was inapplicable to the instant case because no
criminal penalty attaches to a welfare recipient's refusal to permit a
28. Mr. Justice White, the author of the majority opinions in Camara and See, concurred in
the result but disagreed with the Court's conclusion that the home visit is not a search. 400 U.S. at
326. Mr. Justice White evidently would have reversed on the basis that the caseworker's visit
constitutes a reasonable search.
29. 400 U.S. at 326.
30. "The Federal Handbook of Public Assistance Administration provides: 'The [state
welfare] agency especially guards against violations of legal rights and common decencies in such
areas as entering a home by force, or without permission, or under false pretenses; making home
visits outside of working hours, and particularly making such visits during sleeping hours.
Id. at 346.
31. Mr. Justice Brennan joined in Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent.
32. Probably the most significant factor in the instant decision is the change in Court
personnel since Camara. The 6-man majority in Camara was diminished by the retirement of Chief
Justice Warren and the resignation of Mr. Justice Fortas. They were replaced by Chief Justice
Burger and Mr. Justice Blackmun, both members of the new majority. Mr. Justice White switched
sides. See note 28 supra.
33. See, e.g., materials cited note 21 supra.
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home visit. From this reasoning, it would seem to follow that any
governmental intrusion not enforced by criminal sanctions falls outside
fourth amendment protection.3 4 It also is arguable that Camara has been
overruled and Frank reinstated,3 since the Court expressly recognized
that a caseworker is under a statutory duty to report criminal violations
detected during the home visit.36 If this interpretation is correct, few, if
any, administrative searches will be barred by the fourth amendment.
The Court's alternative rationale also poses troublesome questions.
Apparently, the Court concludes that an investigative entry by an
administrative official, at least to homes of welfare recipients, is a
reasonable search, and, therefore, does not require a warrant.37 The
34. The validity of the Court's rationale becomes questionable when applied to criminal law.
The Court holds the search is outside the fourth amendment's scope since refusing the warrantless
search results in no criminal penalty. This ratio decidendi is inapplicable to the amendment's
protection in the criminal field since the very purpose of the fourth amendment is to insure an
individual's right to refuse to submit to a warrantless search for criminal evidence without suffering
any consequences. See generally Lasson, supra note 1I, at 107-24. Moreover, the Court's
formulation provides a simple means of reinstating administrative searches. Since Camara is
distinguished as applying only when a criminal penalty attaches to an individual's refusal to allow a
search, a statute with no criminal sanctions would avoid Camara. An ordinance of a housing
authority for example could provide that if the occupant of a dwelling refuses entry to an inspector,
the building would be assessed with the costs of obtaining a court order granting the inspector power
to enter, as well as all expenses for remedying any defects. Compelled rehabilitation of a dwelling is
easier to justify than the "rehabilitation" proposed for plaintiff because a building code violation
could threaten the lives of many people in the area. Under the rationale of the instant decision, the
fourth amendment offers no protection against the hypothetical housing authority ordinance since it
is not enforced by a criminal sanction.
35. The Court distinguishes Camara by noting that no criminal penalty attaches to a welfare
recipient's refusal to submit to a home visit. It is obvious, however, that if the visit is conducted, and
the caseworker observes and reports a violation of the law, this information could be the basis of a
subsequent criminal prosecution. Apparently the instant Court would uphold the conviction of a
welfare recipient on the basis of evidence found in a caseworker's home visit against a fourth
amendment challenge. Since Frank upheld a defendant's conviction in connection with an
administrative search, it would appear that the reasoning of that case has been resurrected.
36. N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 145 (McKinney 1966) provides in part: "Whenever a public
welfare official has reason to believe that any person has violated any provision of this section, he
shall refer the facts and evidence available to him to the appropriate district attorney or other
prosecuting official." This section makes obtaining AFDC by fraud, or failing to report the receipt
of funds from any other source, a misdemeanor unless governed under other sections of the penal
code. The N.Y. PENAL LAW § 175.35 (McKinney 1967) classifies as a felony the filing of a
statement, known to be false, to mislead a public official. An AFDC recipient, who made false
statements in an application for assistance, could probably be convicted of a felony under this law.
Cf. People v. Licausi, 23 Misc. 2d 75, 200 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Suffolk County Ct. 1961) (conviction of a
felony under § 175.35 for fraud in obtaining workmen's compensation upheld despite another law
providing that obtaining workmen's compensation by fraud is a misdemeanor).
37. Mr. Justice White would apparently support this view. See note 28 supra. The Court
considered its statement in Camara that a warrantless search is unreasonable except in carefully
defined areas, but only in deciding whether or not the visit was a search. 400 U.S. at 317. The Court,
however, failed to consider this statement when it discussed whether the search was reasonable, and
failed to presume the warrantless search unreasonable as required by See.
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majority found the instant search reasonable in light of the balance
struck between the individual's interest in preserving the privacy of her
home and the state's supposedly paramount interests in preventing child
abuse, rehabilitating the recipient, and determining eligibility. It is
submitted that this kind of ad hoc evaluation of the circumstances
surrounding each governmental search, in order to measure the
reasonableness required by the fourth amendment, eviscerates the
absolute protection against administrative intrusions that many thought
Camara guaranteed. 31 Moreover, the governmental interests relied on by
the Court in characterizing compulsory home visits as reasonable
intrusions suggest that states will find little difficulty in justifying
warrantless searches. The Court, for example, places its imprimatur on
the state's need to investigate the possibility of child abuse. If based on
the premise that welfare recipients are more likely than affluent parents
to mistreat children, the Court's approach indicates a class concept
inconsistent with the tenets of American democracy. 39 If, on the other
hand, the state has a broad-based right to inspect for child abuse, no
home is safe from governmental intrusion. Clearly, the power to invade
any family's privacy without a search warrant or the occupant's consent
has great potential for abuse and oppression. It is also difficult to accept
the majority's conclusion that the home visits are reasonable because of
the state's need to rehabilitate the welfare recipient. To hold that the
state has a right to foist rehabilitation upon an impoverished person
despite his objection to ministrations in his home is blatantly
paternalistic." Additionally, the Court gave little consideration to the
right of privacy that exists apart from the fourth amendment.41 In light
of the Court's recent decisions imparting broad constitutional
dimensions to this right, 42 the instant holding appears extremely
38. See materials cited note 21 supra.
39. For example the Declaration of Independence states: "We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal . See also 400 U.S. at 342 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting).
40. Id. at 343. The Court's emphasis on the state's interest in preventing fraud is equally
indefensible. In other forms of governmental subsidy, farmers and airlines, for example, the possible
penal consequences of fraud are considered a sufficient preventive device. With AFDC, however,
$500 million is expended annually for policing, and the need to monitor welfare funds is considered
sufficient to justify ignoring an individual's right to be free from governmental intrusion. Id. at 326-
35 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Wright, Poverty, Minorities, and Respect for Law, 1970 DuKE L.J.
425,437-38.
41. It is possible to view the section of the Court's opinion concerning the reasonableness of
the search as a discussion of the non-fourth amendment aspects of the right of privacy. It is not
clear, however, whether this was the Court's purpose.
42. See notes 7-10supra.
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regressive. Equally objectionable is the Court's approval of the state's
practice of conditioning welfare assistance upon the recipient's surrender
of the right to be free from governmental intrusion.13 Allowing the state
to impose unconstitutional conditions upon the receipt of its largess
contravenes all established precedent." It is unfortunate that the Court
has embarked upon an interpretation of the fourth amendment that will
allow states to fashion a variety of administrative invasions of individual
privacy outside the amendment's proscription. It is submitted that this
construction of the fourth amendment finds justification neither in logic
nor history, and more importantly, leaves every private residence
vulnerable to unwanted and unwarranted bureaucratic intrusions.
Consumer Protection Law-Standing -United States
Has Standing To Seek Injunction Against Practice of
Obtaining Default Judgments Through False Affidavits
Certifying Service of Process
The United States sought to enjoin' defendant, an "easy credit"
43. The instant case also is indicative of an unfortunate trend in the Court's treatment of
public welfare. In a series of decisions under Chief Justice Warren, the Supreme Court sharply
curtailed the freedom of states to regulate welfare. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(requiring hearing prior to termination of benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(prohibiting durational residency requirements for receipt of welfare); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968) (invalidating "substitute father" regulation). The Court under Chief Justice Burger
apparently is reversing this trend. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), for example, the
Court upheld the right of states to impose maximum grants for AFDC despite contrary holdings by
4 district courts. See 23 VAND. L. REV. 1390, 1394 & n.30 (1970). Coupled with Dandridge, the
instant decision may indicate a permanent departure in the Supreme Court's attitude toward public
welfare. See id. at 1397.
44. 400 U.S. at 326-28 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 344-46 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting). See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 404, 406 (1963); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595, 1599-602 (1960).
An innuendo in the majority's opinion suggests that plaintiff's constitutional claim is tenuous
because she voluntarily receives welfare. This implication has ominous overtones since it generally
has been conceded in recent years that a state cannot rely on the right-privilege distinction to
mistreat welfare recipients. See Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627
n.6 (1969); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245, 1255 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 739-40 (1964).
I. Plaintiff also prayed for invalidation of the prior default judgments unlawfully obtained by
defendant, an accounting for sums realized upon these judgments, written notice of the judgment in
the instant case to each alleged victim of an unlawful judgment, and restitution and compensatory
or punitive damages, or both. Further, plaintiff sought costs and attorney's fees to any judgment
debtor who establishes a right to relief within 120 days after receiving the written notice. United
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direct sales retailer,2 from continuing an allegedly longstanding and
systematic practice3 of obtaining default judgments through false
affidavits certifying service of process. "Sewer service,"' 4 as the practice
is called, consists of the deliberate non-service of summonses and
complaints on consumer debtors 5 by creditors, coupled with the
falsification of affidavits of service.6 These false affidavits are then used
to obtain default judgments against the debtors when they fail to appear
or file timely answers to the undelivered summonses or complaints. The
default judgments are later enforced by garnishment of the debtors'
wages or other methods.7 The United States contended that the
defendant's sewer service practices created substantial burdens on
interstate commerce and resulted in widespread deprivation of property
through state action without due process of law.' Defendant moved to
States v. Brand Jewelers, 70 Civ. No. 179, at 6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1970). For a discussion of Brand
Jewelers see 39 U.S.L.W. 2219.
2. In addition to Brand Jewelers, Inc., its president, and its attorney, other defendants were
the "process serving defendants:" two corporate process serving agencies, notaries public who
certified the affidavits of service, and individuals employed in the physical business of serving
process.
3. Brand Jewelers, Inc. obtained default judgments against more than 90% of the defendants
named in the thousands of summonses and complaints it filed each year claiming damages for
failure to meet installment payments. 70 Civ. No. 179, at 4.
4. A 1965 study conducted by the Congress of Racial Equality revealed that more than 97%
of "collection" actions brought by several Harlem merchants ended in default judgments, whereas
only 73.5% of case§ brought by Macy's department store in the same time period ended in default
judgments. Installment Sales: Plight of the Low-Income Buyer, 2 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 11
(1966). The same CORE investigation found that 12 corporate plaintiffs in New York County Civil
Court brought approximately 30,000 cases in one year; of the 28,000 that went to judgment, only
500 did not end in default judgment. Abuse of Process: Sewer Service, 3 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
17, 18 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Sewer Service]. The fact that sewer service is responsible for the
extraordinary frequency of default judgments has been shown by several independent studies in
which workers attempted to call on all the addresses at which typical process servers purported to
have made service on a given day. They found the task physically impossible. Other studies have
shown that a large percentage of the addresses at which process servers claim to have located and
served defendants do not exist or have not been the residences of the defendants for a considerable
time before the process was allegedly served. See id. at 18-19.
5. Brand Jewelers sells its merchandise primarily on a door-to-door basis in slum and ghetto
areas. The purchasers are almost invariably "poor and are members of economically and culturally
deprived minority groups." 70 Civ. No. 179, at 3.
6. The affidavits, alleged to be fraudulent certifications that legal process has been served,
are notarized by New York officials before being introduced into court.
7. 70 Civ. No. 179, at 4. For a discussion of enforcement methods see Note, Enforcement of
Judgments, 61 L. Soc. GAZ. 663 (1964).
8. Plaintiff's complete allegations were that the practice of sewer service by defendant
"[v]iolate[s] the Constitution and laws of the United States, impede[s] and burden[s] the United
States in the exercise of its powers and the discharge of its responsibilities, and create[s] a public
nuisance of direct concern to the United States, in that (a) many victims of default judgments are
deprived of property without due process of law; (b) affidavits deny that defendants are in military
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dismiss for lack of standing, 9 alleging that its actions were not direct
physical burdens on interstate commerce and that to grant the
government standing would provide it with an overwhelming and
awesome power. 10 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, held, motion denied. The United States has
standing to seek an injunction against the practice of obtaining default
judgments through false affidavits certifying service of process. United
States v. Brand Jewelers, 70 Civ. No. 179 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 8, 1970).
Although the question whether a litigant has proper standing to
maintain a lawsuit has long plagued the courts," it was not until
recently that the Supreme Court, in Baker v. Carr,12 enunciated the
essence of the question of standing. The majority held that the
determinative factor was whether the litigant had "such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. ' 13
Subsequently, in Flast v. Cohen,'4 the Court refined this general
definition to insure that the question of standing would be answered with
emphasis on the real interest of the party making the assertion rather
than with reference to the justiciability of the issues presented.'
5
Although no case law has developed concerning the standing of the
service without knowledge of the facts, violating the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act, 50 U.S.C.
App. § 520; (c) garnishments of wages and other practices of defendants impose a substantial
burden on interstate commerce and hinder the proper operation of federal bankruptcy law; (d)
federal revenue collections are jeopardize[d] because false default judgments are used to support
improper bad debt deductions; (e) the default judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in states
other than New York; (f) notices of default are sent through the United States mails; (g) defendants'
practices undermine public confidence in the courts and in the rule of law ... ; (h) these practices
arise from and in turn exacerbate urgent contemporary problems of poverty, urban disorder and
race relations-problems that the United States is actively seeking to alleviate and resolve through
programs involving the expenditure of federal funds and by other means; and (i) defendants'
practices jeopardize the purposes for which the Constitution of the United States was ordained and
established. . . as set forth in the preamble. ... 70 Civ. No. 179, at 5-6.
9. Defendant moved to dismiss under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
10. Defendant also argued that plaintiff's allegations should not be presumed to be true for
the purpose of ruling on the motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
I1. Some of the classic cases deciding standing issues are Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44
(1943) (standing may not be gained by asserting the rights of another); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923) (taxpayer has no standing to challenge utilization of tax revenues); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915) (employee permitted to assert the rights of his employer).
12. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
13. Id. at 204.
14. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
15. Id.at99-100.
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United States to enjoin the practice of sewer service, there is ample
precedent upholding the standing of the government to utilize the courts
in attempts to remove substantial burdens on interstate commerce.7 In
re Debs t8 is the fountainhead of judicial authority on this point. In Debs,
the Supreme Court upheld an injunction against the continuation of a
railroad strike and boycott on the theory that the United States had
standing to seek injunctive relief when interstate commerce and the
carriage of the mails were forcibly obstructed. 9 The majority reasoned
that since the Constitution expressly grants the national government
control of interstate commerce, 2 the government can exercise its power
to prevent unlawful interference with interstate commerce by "appeal in
an orderly way to the courts for a judicial determination,"2 just as it can
proscribe criminal activity in the same area. The broad mandate of the
Debs doctrine was expanded in an entirely different context in United
States v. City of Jackson,22 in which the court held that the Attorney
General of the United States had standing to sue, without statutory
authorization, to remove the burdens on commerce that result from
racial segregation of interstate travel facilities.? In rejecting the idea that
some forcible obstruction of commerce was necessary, the court implied
that the principles of Debs did not rest on the existence of a physical
obstruction, but emanated from the fundamental power of the federal
government to protect the public in areas of national concern .2  This
same principle has led a number of courts to recognize that there is no
justifiable reason for distinguishing between the Government's authority
16. The instant case was predicted, however, by an article advocating federal action as a
means of rectifying the evils of sewer service. Baer, The Magnitude of Consumer Fraud and a
Summary of Some Counter Weapons, 4 N. ENG. L. REv. 97, 100-04 (1969).
17. E.g., United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, rehearing denied, 320 F.2d 870 (5th
Cir. 1963); United States v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp. 590 (M.D. Ala. 1962); United
States v. United States Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D. Ala. 1961).
18. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
19. Id. at577.
20. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
21. 158 U.S. at 582.
22. 318 F.2d 1, rehearing denied, 320 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1963), noted in 32 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 375 (1964), and 77 HARV. L. REv. 1157 (1964).
23. Other decisions that have applied the commerce theory to racial segregation are United
States v. City of Shreveport, 210 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. La. 1962), and United States v. City of
Montgomery, 201 F. Supp. 590 (M.D. Ala. 1962). For a thorough treatment of civil rights in
transportation and the standing of the Government to sue see Dixon, Civil Rights in Transportation
and the ICC, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 198 (1963); Pollack, The Supreme Court and the States:
Reflections on Boynton v. Virginia, 49 CALIF. L. Rev. 15 (1961).
24. 318 F.2d at 15; see United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 367-68 (1888);
United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 285-87 (1888).
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to protect against burdens on interstate commerce and its authority to
protect against widespread deprivation of property without due process
of law.?- The Debs doctrine also has been relied upon to uphold the
standing of the United States to seek injunctions against improper
changes in union contracts that threaten to obstruct interstate
commerce, 2 collection from servicemen of taxes barred by federal law, 2
and obstruction of navigable waters.2
For the purpose of deciding the standing issue, the instant court
assumed that the plaintiff's allegations were true. Referring to the
Jackson decision, the court then dismissed the defendant's attempt to
distinguish Debs on the ground that the alleged wrongs were not physical
obstructions of interstate commerce. The court reasoned that the essence
of Debs was not directness or physical force, "but an obstruction of
broad impact, sufficient in its dimensions to be thought 'public' rather
than 'private,' causing. . . injury of such moment as to bring fairly into
play the National Government's 'powers and duties to be exercised and
discharged for the general welfare . . . .'" The court further found
that, although the power of the Government is great, its exercise by the
Attorney General is subject to judicial and congressional control. The
court concluded, therefore, that the United States had standing to sue to
remove large-scale burdens upon interstate commerce and denied
defendant's motion. For essentially the same reasons, the court
alternatively held that the Government had standing to sue to remove
widespread deprivation of property resulting from state action without
due process of law.
Although the favorable determination of the standing issue in the
instant case seems justified, the utilization of the Debs doctrine to extend
federal power raises potential problems. The theory of standing relied
upon by the instant court, for example, would presumably sustain suits
by the federal government to enjoin activities of militant political
organizations, or even consumer protection groups, insofar as they
constitute substantial burdens on interstate commerce. Because of this
possibility, it is hoped that future courts will not expand the use of the
25. E.g., United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, rehearing denied, 320 F.2d 870 (5th
Cir. 1963); United States v. Lassiter, 203 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. La.), aff d, 371 U.S. 10 (1962); United
States v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp. 590 (M.D. Ala. 1962); United States v. United States
Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D. Ala. 1961). Contra, United States v.
Biloxi Municipal School Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Miss. 1963).
26. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 348 F.2d 682,685 (5th Cir. 1965).
27. United States v. Arlington County, 326 F.2d 929, 936 (4th Cir. 1964).
28. Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405,426 (1925).
29. 70 Civ. No. 179, at 17.
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Debs doctrine without looking beyond the immediate determination of
the substantive commerce issue and considering possible applications of
the doctrine to presently unforeseen areas of concern. In determining the
necessity of applying the Debs doctrine, courts also should consider the
availability of alternative solutions to the problem that the government's
suit is designed to correct. The instant court, for example, could have
reviewed several possible alternative solutions to the problem of sewer
service. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is empowered by section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to enjoin "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce"3 0 and also has control of federal
consumer credit protection. 31 Nevertheless, the language of section 5
referring to unfair acts "in commerce," rather than to acts "affecting
commerce," has been construed to create a jurisdictional bar to FTC
activity in most localized consumer fraud practicesY.3  Furthermore, a
majority of the present commissioners have stated that the FTC should
not become deeply concerned with "ghetto fraud."' State law also fails
to provide a viable alternative method of combating sewer service. New
York, for example, has no comprehensive consumer protection code but
relies on scattered legislative provisions to combat consumer fraud.
34
Under existing New York law, two possible means of attacking the
problems of sewer service have been advanced: criminal prosecution of
process servers and bar association sanctions against attorneys who are
involved with the fraudulent service practices. These methods, however,
do not reach the origin of the problem. The process servers and attorneys
are merely agents of the merchant plaintiffs, who neither expect nor
desire that debtors actually be served.36 The source of the problem is
30. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
31. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (Supp. V, 1970).
32. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941) (rejecting FTC's claim of jurisdiction over
localized fraud on the ground that the local practice affected the competitive success of interstate
business rivals); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION 51-53 (1969); see Note, Jurisdictional Fetter on the FTC, 76 YALE L.J. 1688,
1693 (1967).
33. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 32, at 50-51. Three reasons are given for this position:
(1) effective action against ghetto fraud necessitates criminal sanctions beyond the powers of the
FTC, and the primary offenders are fly-by-night operations unlikely to be affected by the FTC's
injunctive powers; (2) local officials could handle the situation better; and (3) the FTC has no
jurisdiction over localized consumer fraud practices. Id.
34. E.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (MeKinney Supp. 1970) (deceptive practices); N.Y.
PaRS. PROP. LAW §§ 401-18 (McKinney Supp. 1970) (retail installment sales).
35. Sewer Service, supra note 4, at 22. Criminal action against city marshals is also
suggested.
36. 70 Civ. No. 179, at 4.
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similarly unaffected by proposed statutes3 7 that would make it easier to
challenge default judgments, since these statutes provide only
symptomatic relief for those garnishees who learn of their legal rights.
The City of New York, on the other hand, does have strong consumer
protection legislation, 38 which authorizes the commissioner of consumer
affairs to take punitive and remedial action39 against those who use
unconscionable trade practices in the collection of consumer debts and
to promulgate rules designating what practices will be deemed
unconscionable. 0 This sweeping mandate appears to provide a structure
conducive to the creation of adequate local sanctions against the practice
of sewer service. In a broader perspective, however, it must be noted that
the vast majority of states and municipalities do not have comprehensive
consumer protection legislation and, hence, no effective method of
alleviating the distress resulting from sewer service is available at these
levels. In light of the lack of effective alternatives, therefore, the decision
of the instant court appears justified.
Unless the instant court's determination of the standing question is
reversed, the critical issue now becomes whether the practice of sewer
service constitutes a substantial burden on interstate commerce. It is the
ultimate consequences of sewer service, rather than the activity itself,
that will be the determinative factor in this inquiry." The immediate
result of sewer service is that the victim does not have the opportunity to
raise any defenses to the debt that might be available to him, such as
partial payment, set-off, repossession value, and especially,
unconscionability of the sales contract. 42 In addition to causing
37. Some proposals, for example, have provided for postponing the entering of default
judgments until the expiration of at least 7 days after the default has occurred and requiring 72
rather than 24 hours notice to persons being evicted or dispossessed. See Sewer Service, supra note
4, at 25.
38. City of New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 83, Dec. 29, 1969.
39. The ordinance provides for civil penalties of $500 for each offense and, in the case of
repeated or persistent violations, restitution of all monies received as a result of unconscionable
practices. Id. §§ 2203d-4.0(b), (c).
40. The ordinance defines unconscionable trade practice, in part, as "[a]ny act or practice
. . . in the collection of consumer debts which unfairly takes advantage of the lack of knowledge
. . . of a consumer ... " Id. § 2203d-2.0(b).
41. "If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze." United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S.
460, 464 (1949). See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
42. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (providing for the defense of
unconscionability). See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (absence of meaningful choice in contract may be unconscionable); American Home
Improvement, Inc. v. Macver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964) (contract held unconscionable
on basis of price alone).
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individual hardships, sewer service fosters feelings of distrust and
persecution in those segments of the population that encounter the
practice most frequently. Although some state statutes permit the
reopening of default judgments when a failure of service of process and a
valid defense on the merits are shown,4 the typical victim of sewer
service is unlikely to exercise this option even if it is available to him. He
is generally frightened by authority, unaware of his rights, and
distrustful of a system of justice that he encounters only as a defendant.
Even in a situation in which the debtor has no defense on the merits, the
practice of sewer service deprives him of any opportunity to enter into a
pretrial settlement with the creditor and avoid interest charges, statutory
costs, marshals' fees, and loss of credit standing. More importantly,
however, the effects of sewer service often include garnishment of the
debtor's wages, which frequently results in loss of employment." In
passing the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Congress
acknowledged that wage garnishment proceedings impose burdens on
interstate commerce. 5 For these reasons, it is submitted that the practice
of sewer service constitutes a substantial burden on interstate commerce
that should be prohibited by the courts. Because of the lack of effective
state and local controls, moreover, it is appropriate for the federal
government to seek injunctions against the practice.
Criminal Procedure-Plea Bargaining-Trial Judge's
Participation in Plea Negotiations Does Not Render Plea
Involuntary
Petitioner was charged with armed robbery in a state court
prosecution. Following negotiations between his attorney, the
43. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 317 (McKinney Supp. 1970). N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5015
(McKinney 1963) provides that a judgment may be vacated on the grounds of excusable neglect,
fraud, or lack of jurisdiction.
44. The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 restricts the percentage of the debtor's
wages that may be taken by garnishment and provides that the Act does not interfere with any state
laws prohibiting discharge of employees for reasons of garnishment of their wages by creditors. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1673(a), 1677 (Supp. IV, 1970). The Supreme Court recently held that prejudgment
garnishment, absent notice and a prior hearing, is unconstitutional. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969), noted in 22 VAND. L. REV. 1400 (1969).
45. Congress found that "[t]he application of garnishment as a creditors' remedy frequently
results in loss of employment by the debtor, and the resulting disruption of employment,
production, and consumption constitutes a substantial burden on interstate commerce." Consumer
Credit Protection Act of 1968, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1970).
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prosecutor, and the trial judge, the petitioner was offered a life sentence
in exchange for a guilty plea. By entering a guilty plea,' he avoided a jury
trial and the possible imposition of the death penalty.2 Subsequently,
petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in federal district court, alleging
that his guilty plea had not been made voluntarily and, therefore, that he
had been denied due process of law. Petitioner contended that his plea
was coerced as a matter of law because the trial judge had participated in
the plea negotiation process prior to the time when the plea was entered.
The district court denied relief. On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held, affirmed. The participation of the
trial judge in the plea bargaining process does not, as a matter of law,
render a guilty plea involuntary. Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352 (4th
Cir. 1970).
Contrary to the practice at common law,3 the use of plea bargaining
has become increasingly important to the administration of criminal
justice in the United States.4 In the typical case, the bargaining between
the prosecutor and the accused results in an agreement under which
reduced charges or a lighter sentence are given in return for a guilty
pleaA Since the guilty plea represents both a confession and a
I. Petitioner entered his guilty plea and was convicted in 1957. He subsequently petitioned
several times for habeas corpus relief, once alleging that his plea had been coerced by the court-
appointed counsel. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the petition for failure to substantiate the general
allegations of coercion. Brown v. Smyth, 271 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1959).
2. In Virginia the jury fixes punishment if trial is by jury. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-291 (1960).
If the defendant is tried without a jury, the court fixes the penalty. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-192
(1960).
3. Guilty pleas were not permitted at common law on the theory that the adversary trial was
the most trustworthy method of determining guilt or innocence. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 179 (1926) ("no one ought to be convicted of a capital crime by mere
testimony"); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF
EDWARD 1, at 650 (2d ed. 1923).
4. About 90% of all criminal cases are disposed of by guilty pleas. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION:
THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 n.1 (1966). A recent survey
revealed that approximately 11% of all criminal cases commenced in the federal courts go to trial.
See PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 128, 134 (1969).
5. For an excellent description of the bargaining process see D. NEWMAN, supra note 4. See
also Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968); Note,
Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV.
865 (1964). Early commentators condemned plea bargaining, expressing concern over its ethics,
possible coercion of innocent defendants, and the weikening of the deterrent theory of punishment.
See Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REV. 385 (1951); Miller, The
Compromise of Criminal Cases, I S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927). See generally Weintraub & Tough,
Lesser Pleas Considered, 32 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 506 (1941). More recent commentators have
questioned the constitutionality of the practice on the ground that it induces defendants to waive
their fifth and sixth amendment rights. See, e.g., Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining,
19711
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 24
conviction," it results in a waiver of the accused's constitutional rights to
protection against self-incrimination, confrontation of his accusers,
and trial by jury. 7 Accordingly, when a defendant contends that his
guilty plea was made involuntarily, he is entitled to every reasonable
presumption against waiver. 8 In addition, his guilty plea is subject to the
constitutional requirement that it be made intelligently and voluntarily.9
In view of the well recognized possibilities for abuse,"0 the voluntariness
of a defendant's waiver frequently has presented difficulties for the
courts. In a line of decisions generally related to plea bargaining, the
Supreme Court has consistently found that a guilty plea was made
involuntarily when it was exacted by means of physical coercion, violent
threats, or misleading promises." These decisions, however, have
provided little guidance in cases raising the more specific problem of
judicial participation in the plea bargaining process. In considering this
problem, several lower courts have ruled that the determination that a
guilty plea was coerced is a fact question requiring an analysis of all the
circumstances surrounding the plea.' 2 Within this analytical framework,
83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970). Criticism also has developed because the practice results in
differential sentencing. Id. at 1397. But see D. NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 112-31; Note, Official
Inducements to Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Marketplace, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 167, 183-86
(1947).
6. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220,
223 (1927).
7. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
8. See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) (right to jury trial may not be waived by
the defendant's counsel when the defendant expresses a contrary intention); Carnley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506, 516 (1962) ("[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible"); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1942) (waiver of right to counsel must be affirmative); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waiver is "an intentional relinquishment of a known right or
privilege").
9. The federal requirement as stated in FED. R. CRIM. P. II provides: "The court may refuse
to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea. . . without first addressing the defendant
personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea." Failure to observe this rule was held prejudicial in
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), and was made a constitutional requirement in
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Despite the Boykin decision, only 6 states have adopted
the federal standard: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West Supp. 1971); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 95-1606(e) (1969); DEL. SUPER. CT. (CRIM.) R. 11; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.170; Ky. R. CRIM.
P. 8.08; Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.04.
10. See Dash, supra note 5.
11. See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) (promises of prosecutor gave rise
to issue of coercion); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (agent's threat to throw accused out
window raised issue of coercion); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) (district attorney's
threat to impose higher sentence if defendant did not plead guilty gave rise to issue of coercion).
12. See, e.g., Shipe v. Sigler, 230 F. Supp. 601, 605 (D. Neb. 1964); United States v. Tateo,
214 F. Supp. 560, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The majority of courts have approved the prosecutor's
participation in plea bargaining. See, e.g., Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1967) (permissible
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judicial participation in plea bargaining 3 has been held coercive on at
least three theories: First, the judge's powerful position creates the
impression that his offer of a lighter sentence is a threat of harsher
punishment if it is not accepted;" secondly, the judge's participation
compromises his role as impartial arbiter in the criminal process;
5
thirdly, the certainty of the judge's offer of a lighter sentence may induce
the defendant, whether guilty or not, to plead guilty instead of facing the
hazards of a jury trial and the possibility of a more severe penalty. 6
Regardless of the confusion engendered by the established case-by-case
approach to plea bargaining, few courts have been willing to abandon it
and hold that judicial participation is coercive as a matter of law.
7
Although the Supreme Court has never directly considered the issue, two
for prosecutor to bargain); State v. Olbekson, 7 Ariz. App. 474, 441 P.2d 71 (1968) ("mere fact" of
bargain, standing alone, does not mean plea was coerced); People v. Blevins, 222 Cal. App. 2d 801,
35 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964) (prosecutor's threat to seek death
penalty, when statute provides for death penalty, does not constitute coercion).
13. For a discussion of the different appellate approaches to the plea bargaining problem see
United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963). Judge Kaufman thought
the petitioner should be given a hearing, even though the record contained no supporting evidence of
judicial coercion of the plea. Id. at 309-15 (majority opinion). Judge Friendly, concurring and
dissenting, agreed with Judge Kaufman that judicial participation was not coercive per se, but
argued that since the voluntariness determination was a question of fact already decided by the trial
judge it should receive the benefit of the "unless clearly erroneous rule" of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
319 F.2d at 315-19. Judge Marshall, dissenting, seemed to take the position that participation by the
trial judge is coercive per se. Id. at 319-24.
14. State v. Benfield, 264 N.C. 75, 140 S.E.2d 706 (1965) (judge's comment that he thought
jury would convict held to be coercive).
15. United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("A
judge's prime responsibility is to maintain the integrity of the judicial system . . . . [N]one can
seriously question that if this central figure . . . promises an accused that upon a plea of guilty a
fixed sentence will follow, his commitment has an all-pervasive and compelling influence. ... );
Rogers v. State, 136 So. 2d 331, 335 (Miss. 1962) (words or acts of a judge, whose duty it is to see
that plea is voluntary, "have a much greater significance than acts or words of others"). See also
Note, Judicial Plea Bargaining, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1082, 1089 (1967).
16. See Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966) (judge advising defendant to
confess after conviction or higher sentence would be given); United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp.
560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (during trial,judge informed defendant that if he did not plead guilty and if the
jury then found him guilty, judge would impose "life-on-life" sentences); Letters v. Commonwealth,
346 Mass. 403, 193 N.E.2d 578 (1963) (judge threatened to impose consecutive life sentences unless
guilty plea was entered).
17. But see Mesmer v. Raines, 351 P.2d 1018 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960) (court may not
properly bargain with prisoner to induce guilty plea) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa.
52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969) (holding it is never proper for judge to participate in plea bargaining
process). Judicial plea bargaining has been held noncoercive, as a matter of fact, when the judge did
not meaningfully participate in the bargaining or did not initiate the plea discussions. See United
States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1968) (judge did not meaningfully participate:
no coercion); People v. Darrah, 33 I11. 2d 175, 210 N.E.2d 478 (1965) (judge did not initiate plea
discussions: no coercion).
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recent decisions have indicated that the Court will continue to analyze all
the circumstances of any case in which the voluntariness of a guilty plea
is questioned. In United States v. Jackson,19 the Court examined the
constitutionality of a federal statute authorizing a maximum penalty of
death upon conviction by a jury but only life imprisonment if a guilty
plea was entered. It held that the death sentence provision was
unconstitutonal and the defendant's guilty plea was involuntary because
the statute penalized the defendant's exercise of his right to a jury trial.
Considering a similar statute in Brady v. United States,21 the Court
found that the defendant, having assessed all the factors against him,
pleaded guilty intelligently and voluntarily. Even though the Brady
decision contained language suggesting approval of plea bargaining,
2'
the Court expressly reserved any judgment on the constitutionality of
judicial participation in the process.2 2 In its most recent decision dealing
with the voluntariness of a guilty plea, the Court, in North Carolina v.
Alford,2 3 reaffirmed the standard traditionally applied to the plea
bargaining process-whether the plea represented a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternatives open to the defendant.2 4 The
American Bar Association's response to judicial plea bargaining is
fundamentally different from that of the courts. Rejecting the case-by-
case approach with its tendency toward conflicting decisions, the ABA
standards set forth an objective test to govern the judge's relation to the
plea bargaining process. 25 They permit bargaining between the
prosecutor and defendant's counsel, but restrict the judge's involvement
until after a tentative agreement has been reached .2 Even then, the judge
19. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
20. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
21. The Court considered 4 examples of plea bargaining in the text of the opinion: "(1) The
defendant, in a jurisdiction where the judge and the jury have the same range of sentencing
power, . . . pleads guilty because his lawyer advises him that the judge will very probably be more
lenient than the jury; (2) the defendant, in ajurisdiction where the judge alone has sentencing power,
who is advised by counsel that the judge is normally more lenient with defendants who plead guilty
than with those who go to trial; (3) the defendant who is permitted by prosecutor and judge to plead
guilty to a lesser offense included in the offense charged; and (4) the defendant who pleads guilty to
certain counts with the understanding that other charges will be dropped." Id. at 751 (emphasis
added).
22. Id. at 751 n.8.
23. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
24. Id. at 31.
25. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.1(a) (App'd Draft 1968).
26. Id. §§ 3.3(a), (b). The ABA lists 6 considerations in plea bargaining. Two are
administrative. The others include: (1) A guilty plea represents a willingness to accept responsibility
for one's actions and therefore justifies leniency; (2) the plea will make possible alternative
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is not an active participant; his function is merely to approve or
disapprove the plea agreement. Only one jurisdiction, however, has
approved the ABA standards. 27
In the instant case, the court, finding that the Brady decision
sanctioned judicial plea bargaining, concluded that the constitutional
standard to be applied was whether the judge's involvement rendered the
petitioner's plea involuntary. After analyzing the circumstances
surrounding the plea, the court found that the petitioner's decision was
made freely and intelligently. Shifting to a consideration of the ABA
standards, the majority held that they do not state constitutional
limitations on judicial participation in plea bargaining. 2 Moreover, the
court maintained that since these standards divide plea bargaining into
two steps with the judge having only a veto power over the plea
agreement, their adoption would add an unnecessary circuitousness to
plea bargaining and might terminate a process beneficial to the
administration of criminal justice. Noting the benefit of plea bargaining
to criminal defendants, the court reasoned that its prohibition or
curtailment would deprive defendants of their already minimal
bargaining power. The court, therefore, held that judicial participation
in plea bargaining does not, as a matter of law, render the plea
involuntary. The dissent argued that the court was not compelled to hold
judicial intervention in plea bargaining coercive as a matter of law in
order to reach the conclusion that petitioner's guilty plea was
involuntary. It contended instead that the petitioner's plea was
involuntary because of the fact that it was "generated by the trial
judge." 2'
Although the instant court followed established authority by
approving the factual analysis approach to plea bargaining, its rationale
warrants criticism in two respects. First, the court erroneously relied on
the Brady case to sanction judicial participation in plea bargaining. It is
clear from the Brady opinion that the Supreme Court did not intend to
approve judicial plea bargaining and in fact expressly reserved judgment
on this question.3" Secondly, the court appears to have erred in its
statement that a prohibition of judicial involvement in plea bargaining
correctional measures; (3) the defendant has made public trial unnecessary when there are good
reasons for not having a public trial; and (4) the defendant has given cooperation that will or may
result in prosecution of other criminals. Id. §§ 1.8(a)(i)-(vi).
27. Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969).
28. Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352, 1357 (4th Cir. 1970).
29. Id. at 1358. The dissent concluded that the majority was unwarranted in its reliance on
Brady to validate judicial involvement in plea bargaining. Id. at 1360.
30. See note 22 supra.
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would end all plea bargaining. As the majority noted, the backlog of
criminal cases in the courts remains severe 3 even though 75 percent of all
cases are disposed of with guilty pleas. Since the guilty plea is the
administrative device that aids most in the rapid disposition of cases, the
incentive to continue bargaining for guilty pleas will remain, regardless
of whether the judge participates in the process. Defendants also have an
interest in the perpetuation of plea bargaining since they will always
want to obtain the lightest possible penalty. In this vein, the majority
argued that the exclusion of the judge from plea bargaining would
damage the petitioner's interest by requiring him to bargain without
accurate knowledge of the judge's response to the agreement.32 Studies
have shown, however, that most judges readily accept the
recommendations of the prosecutor.3 If this is true, it should make little
difference whether a defendant has full knowledge of the judge's response
to the pleading agreement; in either instance the sentence imposed should
be about the same. Even if the majority's argument is valid, it does not
follow that judicial participation in plea bargaining must be approved.
Under the ABA standards, for example, a defendant would be required
to reach a plea decision without consultation with the judge. If the judge
indicated that he would not accept the prosecutor's sentence
recommendation, the defendant's interest in making a voluntary plea
would be protected by permitting him either to alter his plea or bargain
further with the prosecutor.
The instant decision also failed to recognize that judicial plea
bargaining poses a serious problem for the judge himself. Permitting the
judge to bargain for pleas forces him into a dual role. If a guilty plea is
entered, the court is required to consider its voluntariness. When the
judge has participated in the plea bargaining, he must make a factual
finding on the effect of his own actions. Not only is it difficult for the
trial judge to make this determination, but his decision is virtually
31. Other authorities have estimated that as many as 90% of criminal cases are disposed of by
guilty pleas. See note 4 supra. As of July 1, 1969, there were 14,763 criminal cases pending in federal
district courts, a 9% increase from the previous year. The backlog has increased steadily since 1961.
See PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 128 (1969). One
commentator who suggested banning plea bargaining, recommended offsetting the resulting
increase in court congestion by procuring more resources for the criminal courts or dropping
"victimless" crimes from the statutes. Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 1387, 1411 (1970). It is doubtful that these suggestions would supply enough relief to permit
abolishing the plea bargaining process.
32. 435 F.2d at 1356.
33. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE:
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 135 (1967).
[Vol. 24
RECENT CASES
unreviewable, particularly when lower court records do not include an
account of plea bargaining. Since the ABA standards remove the judge
from the bargaining altogether, it is submitted that their adoption would
effectively eliminate this problem by making the judge's position
consistent with his traditional role as impartial arbiter. In sum, both on
the practical and the constitutional levels, the ABA standards represent
an adequate and feasible response to the controversy over the judge's
role in plea bargaining. The ABA proposal strikes a balance between
protection of the defendant's right to make a voluntary pleading decision
and the need to preserve judicial detachment in assessing the bargaining
process. It also promotes the court's administrative interest in the rapid
disposition of criminal cases. It is hoped, therefore, that the courts will
give further consideration to the merits of adopting these standards.
Evidence-Statements Obtained in Violation of Miranda
Guidelines May Be Used To Impeach Testifying
Defendant's Credibility
Defendant, arrested on a charge of selling narcotics, voluntarily'
made incriminating statements during police interrogation before being
advised of his right to appointed counsel as required by Miranda v.
Arizona.2 Although the prosecution conceded that the statements were
inadmissible as part of its case in chief, the trial court permitted their
use, over objection, to contradict testimony given by the defendant on an
essential element of the crime charged. 3 The jury was instructed to
consider the statements in question only in passing on the defendant's
credibility and not as evidence of guilt. 4 The defendant was found guilty
and his conviction was subsequently affirmed by the New York Supreme
I. Defendant made no claim that his statements to the police were coerced or involuntary.
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. The State's case depended upon the testimony of an undercover police agent that the
defendant had sold heroin to him on 2 occasions. Defendant testified on direct examination that he
had not sold anything to the officer on the first occasion and that on the second occasion he had sold
2 bags of baking powder, which the officer had mistaken for heroin. This contradicted defendant's
prior statement to the police that he had acted as a middleman to purchase heroin from a third
person for the officer on both occasions and that he had received not only $12 but also a part of the
heroin as consideration for the second purchase. The content of this statement was used in the
impeaching process. Harris v. New York, 91 S. Ct. 643, 644 (1971).
4. Both counsel argued the substance of the impeaching statements in their closing
summations.
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Court, Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals. 5 On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. When
normal evidentiary standards of reliability are satisfied, voluntary
statements that are inadmissible as substantive evidence because of
failure to comply with Miranda guidelines may be used to impeach a
testifying defendant's credibility. Harris v. New York, 91 S. Ct. 643
(1971).
Although evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights ordinarily may not be used to secure his conviction
in a criminal proceeding, 6 a narrow exception to this general rule has
become well established. In the 1954 decision of Walder v. United
States,7 the Supreme Court announced that evidence obtained by illegal
search and seizure may be used for the purpose of impeaching a
defendant's testimony on an issue unrelated to the charge pending
against him. 8 The Court carefully circumscribed its holding, however, by
stating that a defendant may not be deprived of his constitutional right
"to deny all of the elements of the case against him" by allowing the
prosecution to rebut his testimony with illegally obtained evidence.'
Prior to the High Court's 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizonale lower
federal courts expanded the Walder exception to the general exclusionary
5. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245, affd, 25 N.Y.2d 175, 250
N.E.2d 349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1969).
6. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (sixth amendment right to counsel);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (fourth amendment right against unreasonable search
and seizure-principle extended to states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). The purpose of
barring the use of evidence obtained in contravention of the fourth amendment, which makes no
mention of the exclusion of evidence, is deterrence of unconstitutional conduct by the police.
Statements violating Miranda standards are excluded directly by the terms of the fifth amendment.
Kent, Miranda v. Arizona-The Use of Inadmissible Evidence for Impeachment Purposes, 18 W.
REs. L. REV. 1177, 1182 n.22 (1967); see Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV.
938, 1030 (1966).
7. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
8. The defendant, indicted for a narcotics violation, testified on direct examination that he
had never possessed narcotics. The prosecution then introduced the testimony of an officer who had
participated in an illegal raid on the defendant's home 2 years earlier that had resulted in a seizure of
narcotics. The Court emphasized the fact that the defendant's sweeping claim "went beyond a mere
denial of complicity in the crimes of which he was charged . I.." "d. at 65. Since impeachment of
the defendant's direct testimony was at issue, the Court reasoned that Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925), which held that the prosecution could not introduce evidence to discredit a
defendant's response on cross-examination, was distinguishable.
9. The Court reasoned that there was no justification for "letting the defendant affirmatively
resort to perjurious testimony" by providing him with a fourth amendment shield against
contradiction. 347 U.S. at 65.
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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rule in two respects." First, a number of tribunals found no distinction
between phsycial evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure and
statements that were inadmissible because of failure to comply with
required procedural safeguards. 2 Secondly, many courts equated
Walder's limiting phrase "elements of the case" with "elements of the
crime" and held that inadmissible evidence that is germane to a given
case could be used for impeachment purposes if it were neither per se
inculpatory 3 nor directly related to an essential element of the crime
charged." These decisions became increasingly significant as the Walder
exception was impliedly extended, along with federal constitutional
safeguards, 5 to state criminal trials. The landmark Miranda decision,
however, cast considerable doubt upon the applicability of the Walder
exception to pretrial statements that were inadmissible as substantive
evidence." In Miranda, the Supreme Court completed a task begun in
Escobedo v. Illinois17 by abandoning "voluntariness"' 8 as the principal
I1. For discussions of these developments see Kent, supra note 6; Comment, The Collateral
Use Doctrine: From Walder to Miranda, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 912 (1968); Comment, The
Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 939 (1967).
12. E.g., United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966) (confession obtained in
violation of defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel); Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (confession obtained in violation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)). One possible
distinguishing factor, related to the reliability of the evidence rather than the manner in which it is
obtained, was mentioned in Curry, in which the court indicated in dictum that the Walderexception
might not be applied to a coerced confession. 358 F.2d at 904.
13. Compare Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377, 380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (statements
concerning defendant's acquaintance with alleged accomplice and his arrival at scene of crime,
which the court characterized as "lawful proper acts," held properly used for impeachment), with
Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (confession held improperly used for
impeachment since it raised a clear likelihood of prejudice to defendant).
14. Compare United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 911 (2d Cir. 1966) (statements that were
inconsistent with defendant's alibi on "collateral items," such as implication of additional parties
and wearing of moustache on prior occasion, held properly used for impeachment), with Inge v.
United States, 356 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (inadmissible statement held improperly used for
impeachment since it was inconsistent with defendant's testimony on the issue of self-defense), and
White v. United States, 349 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (court held that if statements were found to
be inadmissible on remand they could not be used to contradict defendant's claim of self-defense).
The reason for disallowing the use of this type of evidence for impeachment is to avoid prejudice to
the defendant on the ultimate issue of guilt.
15. A number of recent Supreme Court decisions have made federal exclusionary rules
applicable to the states. E.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination extended to states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth
amendment right to counsel extended to states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth
amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure extended to states). This
development has forced state courts to rely upon federal interpretations of these rules. Kent, supra
note 6.
16. See notes 22-25 infra and accompanying text.
17. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (voluntary confession held inadmissible because police continued
interrogation after defendant requested the presence of an attorney).
18. Prior to Escobedo, the admissibility of a confession was based upon a determination of
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criterion for determining admissibility of pretrial statements in favor of
an objective standard of prescribed police conduct which would better
enable a defendant to exercise his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 9 In a five-to-four decision, 20 the Court held that no
statement obtained from a defendant during custodial interrogation,
absent a voluntary and intelligent waiver of rights, can be used against
him in a criminal trial unless he has previously been warned "that he has
a right to remain silent, that any statement he. . .make [s] may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed."12' Although unnecessary to its
holding in Miranda2 2 the Court's recognition that even exculpatory
statements can be incriminating when used for impeachment purposes,
coupled with its unequivocal pronouncement that these statements may
not be used unless preceded by the required warning, 23 seemed to
preclude the admission of improperly obtained pretrial statements as
either substantive or impeachment evidence. 24 The majority of courts
whether, judging all the circumstances, it could be characterized as a product of the defendant's free
and rational choice. E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (confession obtained after
defendant had been held incommunicado for 16 hours held inadmissible because procured in
violation of defendant's fourteenth amendment right to due process); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936) (confession extorted by physical torture held inadmissible because obtained in
violation of defendant's fourteenth amendment right to due process). See generally Developments,
supra note 7.
19. In Miranda, the Court decided that a case-by-case determination of admissibility based
on the "voluntariness" test was unsatisfactory because of the practical impossibility of ascertaining
all of the subtle factors of coercion present in a police interrogation room. It chose to avoid this
problem by laying down comprehensive guidelines for police interrogation that would provide the
best guarantee against infringement of a defendant's constitutional rights even though the
imposition of these requirements might deprive the police of a useful investigative tool. Exclusion of
confessions obtained in violation of these guidelines was deemed necessary to protect the accused's
rights even though the evidence so acquired was completely reliable. See F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-
INFUCTED WOUND 153-193 (1970). In Johnston v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719,730 (1966), the Court
provided support for the view that neither Escobedo nor Miranda was based upon a reliability
rationale, when it stated that neither decision added to the reliability of the fact-finding process.
Some commentators, however, have suggested that the importance of the reliability factor in these
opinions should not be underestimated. Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some
Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old " Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV.
59, 62 (1966); Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. CHI. L.
REv. 939, 948 (1967).
20. Chief Justice Warren who delivered the Court's opinion was joined by Justices Black,
Brennan, Douglas, and Fortas. Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White dissented.
21. 384 U.S. at 444.
22. The 4 convictions under consideration in Miranda were reversed because the prosecution
had introduced as part of its case in chief pretrial statements that were obtained without the required
warning.
23. 384 U.S. at 476-77.
24. Most commentators have concluded that the Walder exception would be inapplicable to a
pretrial statement obtained in violation of the guidelines prescribed in Miranda. See Kent, supra
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that have since considered whether statements inadmissible under
Miranda may be used for impeachment purposes have concluded that
this use is constitutionally impermissible.21 These courts have reasoned
that illegally obtained evidence is equally incriminating whether
introduced under the guise of impeachment or as a part of the
prosecution's case in chief.21 Moreover, some courts have concluded that
to permit constitutionally tainted evidence to enter a trial for the purpose
of contradicting a defendant's testimony not only would infringe his
right to testify in his own behalf but also would encourage unlawful
police conduct. A few state courts, however, have continued to rely
tenaciously upon Walder and have thus allowed voluntary statements
taken in circumvention of Miranda to be used to impeach a testifying
defendant's credibility.?'
In the instant case, the Supreme Court initially distinguished as
dictum language in the Miranda opinion that could be interpreted as
barring any use of uncounseled statements. 9 The Court reasoned that
the Walder exception, allowing illegally obtained evidence on collateral
issues to be used for impeachment purposes,3 is also applicable to
statements that bear directly upon the crime charged 31 and are otherwise
inadmissible under Miranda. Observing that this limitation on the
Miranda exclusionary rule would not undermine its deterrent effect upon
note 6, at 1186; Note, Limited Use of Unlawfully Obtained Statements to Impeach Defendant's
Credibility: The New York Rule in Light of Escobedo and Miranda, 13 N.Y.L.F. 146, 160 (1967);
Comment, The Collateral Use Doctrine. From Walder to Miranda, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 912,932-33
(1968); Comment, supra note 19, at 947.
25. E.g., United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968); Blair v. United States, 401 F.2d
387 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968); Wheeler v. United
States, 382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1967); State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581, cert. denied,
387 U.S. 943 (1967); Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 164 S.E.2d 699 (1968); cf.
Breedlove v. Beto, 404 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.
1968).
26. See cases cited note 25 supra.
27. E.g., Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172, 180 (9th Cir. 1968); State v. Brewton, 247
Ore. 241, 245,422 P.2d 581, 583, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967).
28. State v. Kimbrough, 109 N.J. Super. 57, 262 A.2d 232 (App. Div. 1970); State v. Butler,
19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969); cf. People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 221 N.E.2d 541, 274
N.Y.S.2d 873 (1966), noted in Note, supra note 24; State v. Grant, 459 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1969).
29. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
31. The statement involved in the instant case was directly related to the central issue of
whether the defendant actually sold heroin to the officer. Since the statement was an admission by
the defendant that he had procured heroin for the officer, it was also per se inculpatory. The
statement, therefore, would seem to fall outside the scope of the more liberal rule developed by lower
federal courts in applying the Walder exception to inadmissible pretrial statements. See notes 13-14
supra and accompanying text.
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proscribed police conduct, 32 the Court concluded that a defendant
testifying in his own behalf should not be permitted to commit perjury
free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.3
Thus, the Court held, in a five-to-four decision,34 that voluntary
statements excluded by Miranda from use in a prosecutor's case in chief
may be properly admitted for impeachment purposes, provided that the
trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies normal legal standards. In a
vigorous dissent challenging the majority's interpretation of Walder and
Miranda, Justice Brennan argued that the defendant's constitutional
right against self-incrimination had been violated3 and that the majority
decision went far toward undoing previous progress in the constitutional
regulation of police conduct.
3 6
Although the Court's reluctance to strengthen the controversial
Miranda rule is not surprising,37 the instant decision will severely limit
the effectiveness of Miranda as a guarantee against unwitting forfeiture
32. The Court dismissed the speculative argument that allowing inadmissible statements to
be used for impeachment would encourage impermissible police conduct as an insufficient
justification for depriving the jury of the valuable aid provided by impeachment evidence. It
concluded that making improperly obtained evidence unavailable to the prosecution for its case in
chief would sufficiently deter proscribed police conduct.
33. The Court stated that "[tihe shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of a defense. ... 91 S. Ct. at 646.
34. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Harlan,
Stewart, White, and Blackmun joined. Justice Black dissented. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Douglas and Marshall joined.
35. After distinguishing the facts in the instant case from those in Walder, Justice Brennan
argued that Miranda identified the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination as the
constitutional specific guaranteeing a defendant the freedom "to deny all of the elements of [the]
case against him," which Walder described as a constitutional right. See text accompanying note 9
supra. Relying upon Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), in which the Court held that
comments by the prosecution on the accused's failure to take the stand violated the fifth
amendment, Justice Brennan reasoned that a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination also is
denied if his choice of whether to deny complicity in the crime is burdened with the risk that illegally
obtained statements might be used to impeach his testimony. Justice Brennan concluded that since
Miranda had disposed of the artificial distinction between direct and impeachment evidence, the
exclusionary rule was applicable to either use of an unwarned statement. See notes 23-24 supra and
accompanying text.
36. "[lit is monstrous that courts should aid or abet the law-breaking police officer. ...
[T]o the extent that Miranda was aimed at deterring police practices in disregard of the
Constitution, I fear that today's holding will seriously undermine the achievement of that objective.
The Court today tells the police that they may freely interrogate an accused incommunicado and
without counsel and know that although any statement they obtain in violation of Miranda can't be
used on the State's direct case, it may be introduced if the defendant has the temerity to testify in his
own defense. This goes far toward undoing much of the progress made in conforming police
methods to the Constitution." 91 S. Ct. at 649.
37. None of the Justices supporting the instant decision were among the majority in Miranda.
Compare note 35 supra, with note 21 supra.
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of the privilege against self-incrimination. A defendant who makes
incriminating statements during interrogation when the Miranda
warning has not been given will hereafter pay a high price to exercise
either his right to testify in his own behalf or his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.38 Assuming that he testifies, he will
be unable to rely upon the ability of a jury to disregard impeachment
evidence in determining the ultimate issue of guilt, 3' on the other hand,
his failure to take the stand may give rise to an equally detrimental
inference of guilt.4' The Court justifies this compromise of constitutional
privileges with a determination that the desirability of maintaining the
integrity of a criminal trial as a truth-finding process outweighs the
importance of absolute adherence to the procedural safeguards created
by Miranda. This marks an abrupt departure from the philosophy of the
Warren Court", and may well indicate that the present Court will
narrowly construe other controversial procedural guarantees when
societal interests predominate.
The Court's adoption of the seemingly discredited "voluntariness"
standard as a test for determining the admissibility of impeachment
evidence42 has one immediate and several potential ramifications. The
immediate consequence is the creation of separate standards for
determining the admissibility of impeachment as opposed to direct
evidence. Although confessions introduced as direct evidence will
continue to be judged by Miranda criteria, impeaching statements will
38. In an empirical study of implementation of the Miranda rule in the District of Columbia,
researchers found a high degree of correlation between failure to give the warnings required by
Miranda and the failure of defendants to request counsel. A similar correlation was found with
respect to the percentage of defendants giving statements to the police. Medalic, Zeitz, & Alexander,
Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt To Implement Miranda, 66
MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1372 (1968).
39. It is generally recognized that a limiting instruction is ineffective to prevent a jury from
using highly probative evidence in its determination of the substantive issue. See. e.g., Shepard v.
United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933); C. MCCORMICK, EViDENCE § 39, at 77 (1954); Comment,
The Collateral Use Doctrine: From Walder to Miranda, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 912,919-20 (1968).
40. Although Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), prohibits adverse comments by
either the court or the prosecution on the accused's failure to take the stand, the prosecution
frequently will be allowed to make general comments that its case is "unrebutted" or that "no one
has denied" the testimony of its witnesses. 2 A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL, & M. MILLER, TRIAL
MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 389 (1967). Moreover, an instruction on the
impermissibility of adverse inferences is obviously ineffective since a jury is apt to construe the
defendant's failure to testify as an indication that he has something to hide. Id. §§ 389-90.
41. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
42. Since the Court emphasized the fact that defendant made no claim that the statements
used for impeachment were coerced or involuntary, the pre-Escobedo decisions would seem to
control the admissibility of pretrial statements for purposes of impeachment. See notes 18-19 supra
and accompanying text.
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be subjected to the more lenient "voluntariness" standard, which the
Warren Court expressly rejected in Miranda. Beyond this, the present
Court's apparent preference for the "voluntariness" standard may
indicate that it would uphold the section of the 1968 Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act in which Congress partially overruled
Miranda by providing that the "voluntariness" test will govern the
admissibility of confessions in federal courts.43 If this should occur, the
states could safely enact similar legislation." Another possible
consequence of the Court's adoption of relaxed standards for the
introduction of impeachment evidence may be, as Justice Brennan has
warned, 45 the precipitation of widespread disregard of Miranda's
procedural safeguards by state police officers.4
Until the instant decision, the limitations expressed in Walder to
safeguard a defendant's right to testify generally had been interpreted to
preclude the use of illegally secured evidence for impeachment purposes
whenever the evidence had a direct bearing on the issue of guilt.47 The
Court's rejection of this qualification of the Walder exception raises the
possibility that the instant decision will be used as precedent for
permitting evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure to be used for
impeachment regardless of its incriminating character. It is apparent
that the Court could not have intended this result because it would
encourage a disrespect for law by government officials more blatant
than that which the Court sought to prevent by refusing to allow
individual defendants to use Miranda as a shield for perjury. It is
submitted, therefore, that the instant decision should be viewed as a
qualification of the Miranda rule rather than a general expansion of the
Walder exception.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3501a-b (Supp V, 1970) (a confession shall be admissible if it is voluntarily
given and that failure to advise a defendant of his rights to remain silent and to assistance of counsel
"need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession"). The Court could avoid this
provision's inconsistency with Miranda by construing the Act as an acceptance of the Court's
invitation in Miranda encouraging Congress and the states to "exercise their effective rulemaking
capacities" to develop "effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting
efficient enforcement of our criminal laws." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). But see
Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 264 & n.81 (1968).
44. See note 43 supra.
45. See note 36 supra.
46. Although Miranda has caused an increase in the number of specific warnings given by the
police, empirical research indicates that police conduct still falls short of the standards set by the
Court. Medalie, Zeitz, & Alexander, supra note 38, at 1362-63. The instant decision cannot be
expected to improve an already poor record of compliance.
47. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
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Taxation-Depreciation-Purchaser of Leased Property
May Not Take Deductions for Depreciation of Lessee's
Improvements
Taxpayer-corporation purchased for 925 thousand dollars certain
land subject to a twenty-year lease.' The lessee had built on the land a
commercial garage that had a shorter useful life than the unexpired term
of the lease. 2 Taxpayer allocated 625 thousand dollars of the purchase
price to the building and 300 thousand dollars to the land;3 for the next
three years, he deducted under section 1671 an annual amount for the
depreciation of his interest in the building. 5 The Commissioner
disallowed the deductions, and the taxpayer paid the assessed deficiency 6
and brought a refund suit, contending that it was entitled to the
deductions since it acquired an interest in depreciable property by
purchasing legal title to the building. The Commissioner responded that
the taxpayer acquired no greater rights than the lessor, who admittedly
had no depreciable interest in the building. After trial before a jury, the
federal district court dismissed the complaint. 7 On appeal to the First
I. At the time of the sale in 1959, the lease was not set at a fixed number of years. It was to
last 20 years after the death of the survivor of 6 named individuals, but in any event no longer than
1990. At the time of the district court trial in 1969, one of the survivors was still living, so the lease
would have lasted from 20 to 21 years longer.
2. The government's contention that the useful life was shorter than the remaining term of the
lease was supported by the taxpayer's own assertion that the useful life of his interest in the building
was less than the term of the lease. See M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 310 F. Supp.
1313, 1314 (D. Mass. 1970).
3. Taxpayer's expert appraisers based these values on the unleased fair market value of the
land and the building. "[The taxpayer's] expert was not aware, at the time he made his appraisal of
the premises and his allocation of the purchase price as between land and building, that the building
was subject to the long term ground rent lease." Id. at 1316.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a) provides:
"There shall he allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion,
wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)-
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income."
5. Taxpayer could only take a deduction for its interest in the building because land is a
nondepreciable asset. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1970). The taxpayer took deductions of $39,899.71
in 1962, $36,907.23 in 1963, and $34,139.19 in 1964. Taxpayer used the double declining balance
sheet method approved by § 167(b), taking a useful life of 20 years. This method can be used only
when tangible assets are involved. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2
(1970).
6. The deficiency amounted to $57,009.21.
7. The district court found that the taxpayer purchased: (1) the fee simple title to the land; (2)
the right to reversion in the land; (3) a bare possibility of reverter in the case of the early death of all
the measuring lives or a material default by the lessee; (4) the right to receive ground rentals totaling
$2,711,000 if the lease ran until 1990. The district court further found that the taxpayer received no
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Circuit Court of Appeals, held, affirmed. The purchaser of leased
property on which the lessee has constructed a building may not take
annual depreciation deductions on the portion of the purchase price
allocated to the building. M. DeMatteo Construction Co. v. United
States, 433 F.2d 1263 (1st Cir. 1970).
Section 167(a) of the Internal Revenue Code8 allows a taxpayer to
recoup his capital investment9 in a depreciable asset over its useful life by
taking an annual "depreciation" deduction against income. 10 To qualify
for a deduction under this section," an asset must have a basis, 2 be held
for the production of income or used in taxpayer's trade or business, 3
and be subject to economic exhaustion. 4 Although land is not a
depreciable asset since it fails to meet this latter requirement,
improvements on land are exhaustible and therefore depreciable. 5 An
owner can depreciate the improvements even if he later leases the land
and the improvements. 6 Likewise, a lessee may depreciate any
improvements that he constructs on the land.' 7 Neither the lessor nor the
lessee, however, is entitled to a deduction for the depreciation of the
other's improvements, 8 even though the lessor holds the legal title to the
interest in the building. See M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1313, 1314-15
(D. Mass. 1970).
8. See note4supra.
9. Whether the taxpayer has a capital investment will usually determine if he has a
depreciable interest entitled to the deduction. Goelet v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 305, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), affd, 266 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1959); Frieda Bernstein, 22 T.C. 1146, 1150 (1954),
affd, 230 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1956). But see notes 24 & 46 infra. Generally, the taxpayer owns directly
any capital investments. A taxpayer, however, is allowed a depreciation deduction when he has only
an equitable interest in the property. Thus, when a lessee constructs improvements on a piece of
property, he is entitled to a deduction even though legal title to the improvement is in the lessor.
Duffy v. Central R.R., 268 U.S. 55 (1925). See generally 4 J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 23.06 (1966).
10. This deduction, like all other deductions, is a matter of legislative grace. See, e.g.. Detroit
Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943); Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Iron Co. v. United
States, 14 F. Supp. 918, 920 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 581 (1936); 4 J. MERTENS, supra note
9, § 23.01.
11. If the asset does not qualify for the depreciation deduction, then the taxpayer can recover
his basis upon ultimate disposition of the asset. Comment, Depreciation of Property Acquired
Subject to a Long Term Lease, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 72, 76 (1963).
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(9).
13. Id. g 167(a). This requirement has caused little problem when the lessor transfers
property, since the property will usually be held for rent in the hands of the transferee.
14. Id.
6". Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1970).
16. E.g., Gulf, M. & N. R.R. v. Commissioner, 83 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
574 (1936); Terminal Realty Corp., 32 B.T.A. 623 (1935); Treas. Reg. § 167(a)-4 (1970).
17. E.g., Duffy v. Central R.R., 268 U.S. 55 (1925); Nelson v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 649
(8th. Cir. 1950); Treas. Reg. § 167(a)-4 (1970).
18. Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954);
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lessee's improvements. When either the lessor or lessee transfers his
depreciable interest, whether by gift, inheritance, or purchase, his
transferees are entitled to any depreciation deduction that he could have
taken. 9 The propriety of a deduction is unclear, however, when a lessor
who has no interest in the lessee's improvements transfers his property
and the transferee attempts to take depreciation deductions on the
lessee's improvements."0 Section 167 provides no answer to this issue and
conflicting judicial determinations have only added to the confusion.
Several early Tax Court decisions involving transfers by inheritance
allowed a lessor's devisee to depreciate the lessee's improvements, but
these decisions were overruled because the appellate courts 22 were
reluctant to allow the devisee to take a deduction that had not been
available to the devisor. This position was reinforced by the fact that
the devisee expended no capital to obtain his depreciable basis in the
property. 24 Since a purchaser invests capital in the property, many of
these same courts have suggested, in dictum, that a purchaser should be
First Nat'l Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1951). The basis on which depreciation is allowed is
generally the cost of the property. Since the cost to the lessor of an improvement built or paid for by
the lessee is zero, the basis for the lessor's depreciation is zero. Reisinger v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d
475 (2d Cir. 1944). The burden of proving a tax basis upon which depreciation deductions can be
taken is on the taxpayer. Clinton Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1935);
Kaufman v. Commissioner, 44 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1930).
19. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61, 67 (8th Cir. 1951) (lessor's successor);
Cogar v. Commissioner, 44 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1930) (lessee's assignee); 42 ORE. L. REV. 176 (1963).
The basis that the transferee will get in the wasting asset will depend upon the mode of transfer. If
the transfer is by sale, the basis is the cost to the transferee. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1012. If the
transfer is by inheritance, the basis will generally be the fair market value at the time of death of the
transferor. Id. § 1014. If the transfer is by gift, the basis will be the donor's basis. Id. § 1015. If
both land and its improvements are transferred, then the basis must be allocated between the two.
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-5 (1970).
20. The problem is whether the transferee can take a deduction that the transferor was
disqualified from taking because the transferor had no basis in the property.
21. 3 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 45.09A,
at 4580 (1971); Lurie, Depreciating Structures Bought Under Long Leases: An Adventure in
Blunderland, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 43-44 (1960).
22. Mary Young Moore, 15 T.C. 906 (1950), rev'd, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 942 (1954); J. Charles Pearson, Jr., 13 T.C. 851 (1949), rev'd, 188 F.2d 72 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951).
23. See, e.g., Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 960
(1961); Goelet v. United States, 266 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1959); First Nat'l Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61
(8th Cir. 1951).
24. See First Nat'l Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1951); Martha R. Peters, 4 T.C. 1236
(1945). It is arguable, however, that there is no ground for the distinction because all the Code
requires is a basis for depreciation. The Code does not require that this basis arise from a capital
investment by the transferee. Comment, supra note 1I, at 75 n.22. Some courts have argued that
there is a capital investment in the form of estate taxes. See J. Charles Pearson, Jr., 13 T.C. 851,857
(1949); Charles B. Currier, 7 T.C. 980 (1946). But see note 46 infra.
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allowed a deduction for depreciation of the lessee's improvements.2 In a
1962 case of first impression,'2 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,27 allowed a purchaser to take
the deduction. The taxpayer in World Publishing Co. sought a deduction
based on 300 thousand dollars of the purchase price that it had allocated
to the lessee's building. s Although the building's useful life was shorter
thaii the unexpired term of the lease, 29 the court held that this 300
thousand dollars was a separate depreciable investment in the building
that the purchaser could recoup over its remaining useful life by
depreciation deductions.3 0 The World Publishing Co. decision has been
followed by other circuit courts of appeals .3  Some commentators,
although agreeing that a deduction should have been granted under the
facts of World Publishing Co., have criticized the grounds on which the
decision was based.3 2 Specifically, they have stated that the Eighth
25. See Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573, 580 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 960
(1961); Goelet v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 266 F.2d 881 (2d
Cir. 1959).
26. In 2 other cases, a similar, but not identical, issue was raised. In Bernstein v.
Commissioner, 230 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1956), a deduction was disallowed to a purchaser, but the
purchase price was below the land value so "the cost of the building was already eliminated from the
price." Id. at 604. The issue was raised but bypassed in Annex Corp., 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 167,
173 (1953).
27. 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962) (Blackmun, J.).
28. The court accepted the opinion of the taxpayer's appraisers that "at the time of the
purchase the fair and reasonable value of the building alone was around $300,000." 299 F.2d at 617.
Although the court did not make clear whether this was the present value of the properties as leased
or as unleased, it appeared to be the leased values.
29. In all the cases discussed in this Comment, the useful life of the improvement is shorter
than the unexpired term of the lease. When the economic life of the building outlasts the lease,
several problems arise, such as who can take a depreciation deduction, when can the deduction be
taken, and at what rate can the property be depreciated. See Rubin, Depreciation of Property
Purchased Subject to a Lease, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1134, 1149-51 (1952); Comment, supra note II, at
73 n.8.
30. "[T]he taxpayer is entitled to a deduction under § 167(a) . . .for depreciation of the
$300,000 portion of its 1950 purchase price allocable to the improvements on the real estate in
question." 299 F.2d at 617 (footnotes omitted). The court relied heavily on Millinery Center Bldg.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1955), affd, 350 U.S. 456 (1956), in which the lessee
purchased the lessor's reversionary interest and sought a depreciation deduction on that portion of
the purchase price in excess of the value of the unimproved land. Dictum in that case clearly suggests
that any purchaser should be able to depreciate that part of the purchase price allocated to the
building. Id. at 324. Millinery Center, however, is distinguishable from the instant case because
there the purchaser had the immediate right to the possession of a building that apparently had not
been economically wasted, even though its estimated useful life was over. Comment, supra note 1I,
at 84.
31. 1220 Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1963); Wilshire Medical
Properties, Inc. v. United States, 314 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1963).
32. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 11; 76 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1963); 23 MD. L. REv. 353
(1963). But see 3 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 21, § 45.09A(2); 42 ORE. L. REV. 176, 179
(1963).
1971] RECENT CASES
Circuit's finding that the purchaser acquired an interest in the building3
ignores economic realities because he will receive no rental income from
the building3 and will be able to use it only after the termination of its
estimated useful life.35 These authorities have suggested that the
deduction should have been justified on the ground that the taxpayer had
a depreciable investment in the right to receive favorable rentals from the
lease.3 This suggestion, commonly referred to as the "lease premium" 37
theory, is premised on the idea that since the lessor could not depreciate
the unleased value of the land, a purchaser from him should not be
allowed to depreciate it. If the purchase price is greater than the unleased
value of the land, however, the purchaser must be paying an extra
amount for something other than the land. Since it is economically
unrealistic to say that the purchaser obtains an interest in the lessee's
improvements, the only other asset of value that he might obtain is the
right to receive rentals at a favorable rate. This right will be exhausted as
the lease expires and should therefore be classified as an intangible asset,
33. One criticism of this analysis is that if the lessor has no interest in the building and cares
only about the ground rentals, why did he include a provision in the lease requiring the lessee to
construct the building? 42 ORE. L. REV. 176, 179 (1963). One explanation could be that this is a
common provision in long-term leases. See S. MCMICHAEL, LEASES: PERCENTAGE, SHORT AND
LONG TERM 123-65 (4th ed. 1947). Another explanation could be that the lessor just wanted to
specify the type of structure that would he on the land in the event of a default by the lessee.
34. Since the lessor would receive no extra rental income as a result of the improvements by
the lessee, it would he unrealistic to say that any part of the same rent, if received by a purchaser
from the lessor, was attributable to the building. Nor should the fact that the purchaser receives the
legal title to the building indicate that he is purchasing a depreciable interest in it, because he is not
the beneficial owner. But see note 33 supra. Indeed, it is common to include in most leases
provisions to the effect that the lessor shall hold legal title to the lessee's improvements. S.
MCMICHAEL, supra note 33, at 123-65. Even in the absence of this provision, the lessee's permanent
fixtures become part of the land owned by the lessor as a matter of law in most jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb. 784,792-99, 238 N.W. 659, 664-66 (1931).
35. For a suggestion that the estimated useful life of a structure does not always necessarily
equal that structure's real economic life see note 74 infra and accompanying text.
36. This was an alternate contention in World Publishing Co. See 299 F.2d at 620. In fact,
taxpayers in both the devise and purchase situations have generally alleged in the alternative that
they were entitled to depreciate the building or amortize the lease premium. See, e.g., Frieda
Bernstein, 22 T.C. 1146 (1954); Mary Young Moore, 15 T.C. 906 (1950). One reason why the court
in World Publishing Co. ignored the taxpayer's lease premium contention was that it appeared to
think that under either theory the same amount could be recovered. The taxpayer was responsible
for this assumption in urging recovery of the same amount by either depreciating the building or
amortizing the lease premium. The same approach has been used in other cases when both theories
have been relied on. See, e.g., Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1961); First Nat'l
Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1951). This approach is erroneous. In World Publishing Co. the
portion of the purchase price allocated to the building was its fair market value as leased with the
remainder assigned to the fair market value of the land as leased. See note 28 supra. The lease
premium, however, is the difference between the purchase price and the unleased value of the land.
37. See Comment, supra note 11, at 80. For other suggested interests that the purchaser
receives see notes 73 & 74 infra and accompanying text.
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which qualifies for an amortization (depreciation) deduction.38 The
amount of this lease premium is the difference between the purchase
price and the unleased value of the land at the time it is acquired. The
Ninth Circuit, in an inheritance case,39 is the only court that has allowed
a deduction based on the amortization of the lease premium,40 noting
that under this theory the incongruous result of having two taxpayers
depreciate the same building is avoided. 41 All other courts that have
considered the question, however, have denied taxpayers amortization
deductions on the ground that the lease premium and the land are not
separate interests for the purposes of depreciation.42 This inseparable
interest rationale is based on the incident-to-fee doctrine enunciated by
the Tax Court in William R. Farmer.4 3 The lessor in Farmer sought a
deduction for the depreciation of the lease. The court found that the lease
was merely an incident to the fee and was therefore no more depreciable
than any other ownership right to land. The courts that have refused a
deduction for the amortization of the lease premium have regarded it as
a part of the basis, which as an incident to the fee is not depreciable.44
In the instant case, the court initially noted that since the lessor had
made no cost investment in the building, he had no depreciable interest
in it at the time of the sale. Since the taxpayer could not have received
any depreciable interest from the lessor, the court concluded that he
would have to show his own cost investment in something other than the
land. The court reasoned that since the useful life of the building was
38. Comment, supra note 11, at 77; 41 N.C.L. REv. 135 n.4 (1962). See generally 4 J.
MERTENS, supra note 9, § 23.10. The lease premium in theory is similar to the amortizable bond
premium described in § 171 of the Code.
39. Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954).
The Supreme Court also has denied certiorari on 2 cases with opposite holdings on the issue. See
Schubert v. Commissioner, 366 U.S. 960, denying cert. to 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1961); Friend v.
Commissioner, 314 U.S. 673, denying cert. to 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1941).
40. This allowance was criticized in Lurie, supra note 21, at 54.
41. The lessee will take deductions for the depreciation of the building, and the purchaser will
take them for the amortization of the lease premium.
42. Some courts have accepted the lease premium explanation in theory, but have found it
unsupported by the evidence before them and have doubted its general utility. See World Publishing
Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 614, 620 (1962); Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573, 580-83
(4th Cir. 1961); First Nat'l Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61, 66 n.3 (8th Cir. 1951). Other courts have
rejected it entirely. See Mary Young Moore, 15 T.C. 906 (1950), rev'd, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954); Martha R. Peters, 4 T.C. 1236, 1240 (1945).
43. 1 B.T.A. 711 (1925). In Farmer, the taxpayer argued that since part of the purchase price
was allocable to the right to use the land, a basis for the depreciation of the lease was established
when that right was exchanged for the lease. The Board of Tax Appeals held that a depreciable basis
was not established because no separate value could be assigned to the right to use the land since it is
only an incident to the fee simple. Id. at 713-14.
44. For a discussion of the incident-to-fee doctrine see p. 861 infra.
[Vol. 24
1971] RECENT CASES
shorter than the unexpired term of the lease, the taxpayer purchased only
the bare legal title to the building.45 The court held that no part of the
purchase price was properly allocable to the building and therefore no
deduction could be taken by the taxpayer for its depreciation. Although
recognizing that the Eighth Circuit in World Publishing Co. had allowed
a deduction on identical facts, the instant court declined to follow the
decision," citing the criticism it has received. 47 The court concluded that
the part of the purchase price not allocable to the land should have been
assigned to the lease. 4" Although indicating that the taxpayer may have
had an amortizable basis in the lease, the court refused to consider this
point because it was not argued at the trial level and was not in issue on
the appeal.49
45. See note 34 supra.
46. The court also criticized World Publishing Co. for creating a rule that allowed the
transferee by purchase to take a depreciation deduction when a transferee by gift or devise was not
permitted to take the same deduction. 433 F.2d at 1265 n.5. As the court noted, the Internal
Revenue Code makes no distinction between transferees who acquire a depreciable basis by devise,
gift, or purchase. The Code requires only that the person seeking a deduction have a basis. See note
24 supra. The World Publishing Co. case recognized this and showed consistency in suggesting that
the transferee by gift or devise should also be allowed a depreciation deduction on the lessee's
improvements. 299 F.2d at 621. The court, however, proceeded to distinguish the devise and gift
cases on the ground that no cost investment was made by the transferee. This seems to be an extra-
judicial requirement. Some courts have suggested that this cost investment might have been made in
the form of an estate and gift tax. See J. Charles Pearson, 13 T.C. 851, 857 (1949); Charles Bertram
Currier, 7 T.C. 980 (1946). This, however, is a cost investment by the donor or devisor and not the
transferee. In any event, it is not a cost investment in the property because the estate and gift taxes
are excise taxes on the privilege of transferring property, not on owning property. See, e.g.,
Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953); Friend v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 959,960
(7th Cir. 1941).
47. The court noted criticism in 76 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1963); 23 MD. L. REV. 353 (1963);
and 1963 Wis. L. REv. 484. Each of these student writings suggested that the purchaser should have
been allowed to amortize the lease premium.
48. The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that he had a depreciable security interest
in the building. See note 73 infra. The court found that this was a highly speculative interest, if there
was one at all, and that the taxpayer had failed to prove its worth. The court indicated that its
worth, in any event, was "considerably less than the full value of the building." 433 F.2d at 1265.
But see 63 YAtE L.J. 872, 875-76 (1954).
49. The court's decision on this point is questionable as a matter of law. As heretofore stated,
this case arose on appeal from the trial court's decision granting a motion to dismiss for failure to
present facts sufficient to state a cause of action. The circuit court in the instant case affirmed the
decision on 2 grounds. First, it found that the plaintiff did not sufficiently state that it was seeking
relief under the lease premium theory. The court itself, however, stated in a footnote that:
"Although taxpayer points out that in the claims for refund, and in its complaint, it made reference
to a lease premium amortization theory, it made no such claim at the trial. Three memoranda were
filed in the trial court by the taxpayer. Only the second makes more than brief mention of lease
amortization, and then solely for the purpose of deprecating it as a concept put forward by the
government and rejected by the taxpayer." 433 F.2d at 1264 n.3. This appears to be a sufficient
statement of the lease premium theory, and the instant court's finding that it was not appears to be
controverted by the fact that the trial judge himself regarded it as an alternate contention. See
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The instant decision is the first case since World Publishing Co. to
hold that a purchaser does not have a depreciable interest in the lessee's
improvements. Since two other circuits have adopted the World
Publishing Co. rule,50 it is likely that the Supreme Court will now grant
certiorari to resolve this split in the circuits. Until that time, however, the
Commissioner can be expected to challenge any deductions based on
allocations of the purchase price to leased buildings on which a lessee is
also taking depreciation deductions. Since the instant decision did not
foreclose the possibility that a taxpayer might be able to prove that he
has an amortizable investment in the lease premium, he should argue
that he is entitled to a "lease premium" deduction and should offer at
the trial sufficient proof to establish the fair market value of the unleased
land. 51 Moreover, since the weight of authority still supports the World
Publishing Co. rule, the taxpayer should place primary emphasis on the
contention that he is entitled to depreciate the building.52 It is probable
that he would receive greater annual deductions under this theory,
because the building is likely to have a shorter useful life than the lease
and accelerated depreciation methods53 are only available for the
depreciation of tangible assets.54 Future courts, however, are likely to
find persuasive the instant court's determination that a purchaser
acquires no depreciable interest in a lessee's improvements. The
purchaser has not invested in the right to use the building after the
M.DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1313, 1316 (D. Mass. 1970). The trial
judge dismissed the suit for failure to carry the burden of proof on the value of the lease premium,
not for failure to state a cause of action. Specifically, the trial judge found that the taxpayer's
appraiser failed to value the lease, and indeed did not even know a lease existed. Under the lease
premium theory, however, the value of the lease is not needed to determine the value of the lease
premium; only the unleased value of the land is necessary for this determination. This is exactly
what the appraiser unwittingly valued. The instant court also suggested that the taxpayer had failed
to establish the useful life of the lease at trial. 433 F.2d at 1264 n.2. At the trial, however, it was
proved that the lease would have definitely lasted for 20 years and could have run for 21 years at
most. Since the former estimated life presumably would be more advantageous to the taxpayer
because he would get a faster recoupment of his investment, the court could have penalized the
taxpayer for failing to show a shorter useful life by taking the longer of the 2 possible useful lives. It
is submitted that the instant court should have held, as a matter of law, that the taxpayer stated in
the trial court a cause of action and carried the burden of proof. The instant court should therefore
have either determined, or remanded to allow the trial court to determine, the validity of the lease
premium theory.
50. See note 31 supra.
51. This may be difficult when commercial downtown land is involved because there may be
no comparable unleased land that does not have a building on it.
52. If the taxpayer proceeds with these alternative contentions, he will have to offer 2
valuations. Under World Publishing Co. he must prove the leased value of the building, and under
the "lease premium" theory he must prove the unleased value of the land.
53. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(b).
54. See id. § 167(c).
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termination of the lease, since the building would be economically
wasted by that time; and the building contributes no rental income,
because only the land is leased.55 When a lessee constructs improvements
that have a useful life shorter than the unexpired lease, 56 these
improvements do not, in economic reality, affect the depreciable interest
acquired by a purchaser from the lessor.5 This reasoning avoids the
incongruous result of finding that two taxpayers have made full cost
investments in the same property for which both are entitled to
depreciation deductions. 8 The instant court, therefore, reached an
economically realistic decision in declining to follow the World
Publishing Co. rule that part of the purchase price was properly
allocable to the purchaser's interest in the building. It is submitted,
however, that World Publishing Co. correctly recognized that the
purchaser had made an investment in something other than land and
that this interest would not exist at the expiration of the lease. It is the
failure of the courts to precisely define the nature of this interest that has
created such confusion in this field. 59 It is unfortunate that the instant
court did not undertake to define the nature of the purchaser's interest,
especially since the facts of this case offer an excellent illustration of it.
The purchaser certainly received an interest in a tract of land that
appraisers estimated had an unleased value of 300 thousand dollars.60
Presumably, the land had that value because a purchaser would think
that a 300 thousand dollar investment in it would produce a return equal
to or greater than other available investments. After the property was
leased, it apparently was worth 925 thousand dollars to the taxpayer
because it offered a rate of return obtainable elsewhere only with an
investment of a like sum. In fact, the taxpayer made a good bargain
because it would have received 3,711,000 dollars in ground rentals over
the remaining life of the lease," which is approximately a fifteen percent
yearly return on its 925 thousand dollar investment. The value of the
55. See notes 33 & 34 supra.
56. When the improvements have a longer life, difficult problems arise concerning who is
entitled to depreciate the portion of the useful life that extends beyond the lease. See note 29 supra.
57. See Comment, supra note 11, at 79.
58. Cf. 76 HARV. L. REv. 1303, 1305 (1963).
59. 3 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 21, § 45.09 (1962); Comment, supra note 11, at
73.
60. Since the taxpayer's appraisers did not know that the property was subject to a long-term
lease when they made the appraisal, this $300,000 figure had to be the unleased value of the land. See
note 3 supra. If the court was not satisfied that this was the unleased value of the land without the
building, the proper procedure should have been to seek a clarification on remand. See 76 HARV. L.
REV. 1303, 1306 (1963).
61. M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 3 10 F. Supp. 1313, 1315 (D. Mass. 1970).
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land, therefore, had been increased from 300 thousand dollars to 925
thousand dollars by subjecting it to the lease, and no part of this increase
accrued by virtue of the improvements later constructed by the lessee.
Since the purchaser would have property worth only 300 thousand
dollars at the end of the lease, it follows that he must have invested 625
thousand dollars in the right to the favorable rate of return. 2 This right
to favorable rentals, the lease premium, is an intangible asset that the
taxpayer should be able to amortize over the life of the lease because its
benefits will be exhausted as the lease expires. 3 Otherwise, at the
expiration of the lease, the taxpayer would own land with a basis of 925
thousand dollars and a fair market value of 300 thousand dollars. Thus,
the taxpayer would be taxed on a return of capital" and on disposing of
the property he would realize a loss of 625 thousand dollars, which he
could deduct." A loss deduction, however, is not the equivalent of a
recoupment of a capital investment.
If the instant court had pursued the issue of whether the taxpayer
was entitled to a deduction under the lease premium theory, 6 it would
have been confronted with several objections that the overwhelming
majority of courts have recognized as valid.6 7 Closer analysis of these
objections, however, reveals that they are unfounded. It has been argued,
for example, that it is adminstratively unfeasible to estimate the value of
a lease. Since the formula for determining the lease premium is simply
the purchase price less the unleased value of the land, however, this
objection would be meritorious only if the unleased value of the land
could not be determined. 8 It is submitted that this appraisal is generally
less difficult to make than a determination of the value of the leased
building, which the World Publishing Co. rule requires.69 Courts also
have objected to the lease premium theory because it calls for a
speculative valuation of the unleased land at the expiration of the lease.
These courts have simply misunderstood the theory. 70 Only the present
value of the unleased land is needed to determine the lease premium. The
62. For a discussion of the treatment of an unfavorable lease see Comment, supra note 1i, at
79.
63. See note 38 supra.
64. Taxing as income what is really a return of capital would violate taxpayer's rights under
art. 1, § 2, of the Constitution. See Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
65. See INr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 165.
66. For an argument that the court should have considered the theory see note 49 supra.
67. See note 42 supra.
68. For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in valuing the unleased value of downtown
commercial land see note 51 supra.
69. See note 28 supra.
70. See 3 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 21, § 45.09A(3).
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main objection that courts have raised to the lease premium theory is
that the land itself would be depreciated if the taxpayer were permitted to
amortize the lease premium since the lease premium is only an incident
to the fee. The incident-to-fee doctrine was formulated in William H.
Farmer,7' a case in which a taxpayer who purchased land and
subsequently leased it was denied a deduction for depreciation of the
lease. It is submitted that although the court rightly disallowed the
deduction, it obscured the underlying reason by using technical property
concepts. The underlying rationale of the decision was that the taxpayer,
if allowed a deduction, would have in effect depreciated a nondepreciable
asset, and at the expiration of the lease he would have held the unleased
land with a greatly reduced basis.72 Since the above reasoning was the
real basis of the Farmer decision, it is submitted that the Farmer
incident-to-fee doctrine should not be applied to disallow a deduction for
the amortization of the lease premium when a taxpayer purchases
property already subject to a favorable lease. In this situation, only the
lease premium is amortized, and the taxpayer will never reduce his basis
below the unleased value of the land. A final objection to the lease
premium theory has been that the lease premium does not represent all
of that portion of the purchase price above the unleased value of the
land. Some authorities have suggested that the purchaser receives a
valuable security interest in the building because he has a right to
immediate possession upon a material breach by the lessee.73 Others have
noted that the purchaser may actually be buying a future interest in the
building, if the lessee underestimates the real economic life of the
building. 74 Since these two interests are both depreciable, however, it
would be to the taxpayer's advantage to prove that part of the purchase
price was allocable to them only if their value greatly exceeded the lease
premium. In the absence of this proof, it is hoped that future courts will
recognize that the amount by which the purchase price exceeds the
unleased value of the land should be allocated to the lease premium, for
which an amortization deduction is allowable.
71. I B.T.A. 711 (1925). For a discussion on the parties' contentions see note 43 supra.
72. Id.
73. 3 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 1; Lurie, supra note 21; Rubin, supra note 29; 63
YALE L.J. 872 (1954). The building also has security value as a deterrent to nonperformance. 63
YALE L.J. 872, 875 (1954). When part of the purchase price is allocated to the security interest,
problems arise when the taxpayer seeks to use an accelerated depreciation method or when the
taxpayer has rental insurance. See Comment, supra note 11, at 80-81. The court in the instant case
considered this contention but rejected it because the security value, if any, was too speculative. See
note 48 supra. Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Frieda Bernstein, 22 T.C.
1146 (1954); Annex Corp., 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 167 (1943).
74. The fact that the building has a longer useful life than the lease, however, should not affect
the purchaser's deductible interest for the duration of the lease.
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Torts -Strict Liability -Automobile Manufacturer
Liable for Defective Design that Enhanced Injury After
Initial Accident
Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile that was struck in the
rear by another vehicle. Although the plaintiff sustained only minor
injuries as a result of the impact, she received severe burns when flaming
gasoline from the ruptured gas tank escaped into the passenger
compartment. Plaintiff sued the automobile manufacturer on the theory
of strict liability, contending that the automobile's defective design,
unreasonably increased the risk of harm to the occupants after the
collision. Defendant contended that the negligent driver of the other
vehicle,2 rather than the defective design, caused the accident. Defendant
further claimed that it was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries since
accidents are not within the intended use of an automobile.3 The trial
court held the manufacturer strictly liable. On appeal to the California
Court of Appeals, held, affirmed. An automobile manufacturer is
strictly liable for injuries that are enhanced by the automobile's
unreasonably dangerous design even though the design did not cause the
accident. Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90
Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970).
Liability for defective design4 in automobiles has been based either
on the theory of negligence or strict liability.5 These theories and their
requirements recently have been delineated in the Restatement (Second)
1. The design defect was the placement of an inadequately supported gas tank a small
distance behind the passenger compartment. The tank was vulnerable to rupture and displacement
with the occurrence of a relatively minor impact to the rear portion of the automobile.
2. The plaintiff also sued the driver of the other vehicle for his negligence. The jury found him
liable.
3. Defendant articulated several other contentions: (1) safety standards should be legislatively
formulated; (2) present statutes have pre-empted the field; (3) juries are unable to comprehend
design complexities; and (4) a finding of liability would flood the courts with litigation.
4. Courts traditionally have imposed liability for negligent construction that causes an
accident. Negligent construction defects most frequently occur during the manufacture or assembly
of the product and often are confined to a component part. A defect in design, on the other hand,
raises a more difficult problem since it results from improper planning of the product's form or
structural quality and is therefore generally common to all vehicles of a given model. See Norton
Co. v. Harrelson, 278 Ala. 85, 176 So. 2d 18 (1965); Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers
for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1956); Nader & Page, Automobile
Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 645, 653 (1967); Noel, Manufacturer's
Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962).
5. E.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (negligence); Dyson v.




of Torts. Section 398 states that a manufacturer is liable in negligence
for any lack of due care in adopting an unsafe or dangerous design.,
Section 395 further requires that the product be put to an "expected
purpose" in order for liability to be imposed. Similarly, section 402A,
by virtue of its explanatory comments 7 concerning the "consumer,"
limits a manufacturer's strict liability to injuries caused by an
unreasonably dangerous8 product that the consumer puts to its
"intended use." 9 The cases considering liability of automobile
manufacturers for defective design have attempted to draw a clear
distinction between actions for negligence and actions based on strict
liability. 0 It has been suggested, however, that this traditional
distinction is not viable in the area of defective design since liability may
be based on either ground with equal effectiveness." Although most
jurisdictions have applied the negligence theory, 2 a few courts have
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965) states: "A manufacturer of a chattel made
under a plan or design which makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject
to liability to others whom he should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable
use for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan
or design."
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 402A, comment I at 354
(1965).
8. Elements considered in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous include
the following: "(I) the usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other and
safer products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, (4)
the obviousness of the danger. . .. (5) common knowledge and normal public expectation of the
danger, (6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product . . . .and (7) the ability to
eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly
expensive." Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states: "(1) One who sells any product
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does
reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The
rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller."
10. See Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836
(1966) (denied recovery on negligence theory); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568
(Miss. 1969) (plaintiff sought recovery under negligence theory and court discussed and denied
liability on theory of strict liability).
11. Dean John W. Wade has observed: "In the design cases there is essentially no difference
between a negligence action and an action for strict liability. If the design of a product makes it
unreasonably dangerous, strict liability will lie. But the same proof would normally be sufficient to
permit a jury to find negligence on the part of the manufacturer in using such a design." Wade, The
Continuing Development of Strict Liability in Tort, 22 ARK. L. REv. 233, 243 (1968); see notes 34-
38 infra and accompanying text.
12. E.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
1971]
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 24
imposed strict liability. 3 There has been a strong judicial tendency to
limit a manufacturer's liability to situations in which the defective design
was a cause of the accident. 4 If the design defect only enhanced the
injury, courts have been reluctant to impose liability unless the defect
also was a causative factor of the accident itself. 5 Courts have described
enhanced injuries as "second accident" injuries-those injuries that
occur after the initial accident. Evans v. General Motors Corp." is the
leading case holding that an automobile manufacturer is not liable for a
negligent design 17 that results only in enhanced injuries. The Evans court
based its holding on two propositions: (1) collisions are not within the
"intended purpose" of an automobile despite their foreseeability, and
(2) a manufacturer is under no legal duty to produce a crash-proof car. 8
The Evans rationale has been utilized by several courts to deny liability
in both negligence 9 and strict liability actions.2" These courts, moreover,
have introduced additional arguments against imposing liability for
enhanced injuries. Some judges have reasoned, for example, that because
of the complexities of automotive design, juries are incapable of
apportioning damages between the first and second accidents. 2' Further,
it has been urged that legislatures rather than the courts should
determine the standard for manufacturers.2 2 Other arguments frequently
advanced are that an imposition of liability would result in a flood of
litigation z' and that the alleged defective design should not be actionable
13. E.g., Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (considered both
negligence and strict liability).
14. See Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836
(1966); Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967). An early case
suggesting the possibility of automobile design liability is Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash.
341, 246 P. 945 (1926).
15. See Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 945 (1968); Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
16. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
17. The plaintiff alleged that negligence in the design of the automobile, which had an -X"
frame without perimeter frame rails, caused the death of the operator after a collision. 359 F.2d at
823-24.
18. "A manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile accident proof or fool-
proof; nor must he render the vehicle 'more' safe where the danger to be avoided is obvious to all."
Id. at 824.
19. E.g., Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
20. E.g., Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969) (court recognized
split of authority but accepted Evans rationale).
21. E.g., Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802, 810 (7th Cir. 1967) (Kiley, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968); see 118 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 304 (1969).
22. See Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Walton v.
Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
23. See Nader & Page, supra note 4, at 663; 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 396, 397-98; 118 U. PA. L.
Rav. 299, 305 (1969).
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if it conforms with the "state of the art" in the automobile industry.24
Despite these propositions, several courts have imposed liability on
manufacturers for design defects that caused enhanced injuries.2 In
Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,26 for example, the Eighth Circuit held
that a manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care in its
automotive design to avoid an unreasonable risk that an injury will be
enhanced in the event of a foreseeable collision. The court rejected the
Evans court's narrow construction of the "intended or expected use"
and reasoned that accidents are not unforeseeable in the normal and
expected use of automobiles. Larsen also held that there is no rational
difference between a design defect that causes the initial accident and one
that enhances the possibility of further injury because both result from
negligence and cause injury. 28 Following this decision, a distinct split of
authority has developed 21 concerning a manufacturer's liability for
injuries enhanced by design defects, with some courts following Evans
30
and others adopting the Larsen rationale .
3
In the instant case, the court initially noted that section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) applied to automobile manufacturers and that
strict liability could be imposed if the requirements of the section were
satisfied. The court then rejected the reasoning that a duty to produce a
crash-proof car would result if collisions were found to be within the
intended use of automobiles. Instead, the court found that accidents are
foreseeable consequences incident to an automobile's normal use and
held that although a manufacturer is not required to produce a crash-
proof car, it is under a duty to design an automobile that will not
increase the risk of injury to occupants in the event of an accident.32 The
24. See Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802, 808, 810 (7th Cir. 1967) (Kiley, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968); 118 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 311 (1969).
25. Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Mickle v.
Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
26. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (negligently designed steering column was forced back into
the driver upon the impact of a head-on collision).
27. Id. at 502.
28. Id.
29. While recent cases indicate no trend toward uniformity, several commentators have
predicted a judicial trend toward adopting the rationale of Larsen. E.g., 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 396; 118
U. PA. L. REv. 299, 312 (1969).
30. E.g., Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
31. E.g., Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Mickle v.
Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969); see Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp., 308 F.
Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
32. The court also rejected several policy arguments advanced by the defendant. These
arguments included: (i) establishing standards of design is solely a legislative function; (2)juries are
incompetent to decide cases of automotive design liability; (3) a finding of liability "would create a
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court, therefore, agreeing with the reasoning in Larsen, held that
automobile manufacturers are strictly liable under section 402A for
enhanced injuries caused by an unreasonably dangerous defective design
of their products.33
Many courts that have considered an automobile manufacturer's
liability for design defects that enhance injury during an accident have
been preoccupied with the choice between the theories of negligence and
strict liability.3 4 The instant decision allowed recovery for enhanced
injuries on the basis of strict liability, whereas Larsen allowed recovery
on the basis of negligence. In both these cases, however, the courts have
made the basic policy decision to allow recovery when the plaintiff's
injuries were enhanced by defective design. It is submitted that recovery
should not depend on which theory is adopted by a court since an
examination of the respective requirements of the two theories35 reveals
that there is no practical difference 36 in their application to questions of
liability for defects in design. 37 A court considering the question of
volume of highway crash litigation that would imperil the American judicial system." I I Cal. App.
3d at 923, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 319. The instant court summarily dismissed this last argument by
quoting W. PROSSER, TORTS § 11, at 43 (3d ed. 1964): "It is the business of the law to remedy
wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful confession of
incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on such grounds."
33. I Cal. App. 3d at 925, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
34. E.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Dyson v. General
Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
35. See material cited notes 6 & 9 supra. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)
requires that a product be unreasonably dangerous for its intended use in order to subject a
manufacturer to strict liability, and § 398 requires that a product be dangerous for its expected use
in order to subject a manufacturer to liability for his lack of due care in not adopting a safe design.
36. The type and amount of proof required to show that a design is unreasonably dangerous,
and therefore qualifies for strict liability, is normally sufficient for a jury to find negligence on the
part of the manufacturer in using the design. Wade, supra note 11, at 243. Courts considering both
strict liability and negligence as theories for liability should concentrate on whether the design is
unreasonably dangerous rather than on which theory of liability will be imposed.
37. A defective design that makes a product unreasonably dangerous, and is actionable under
the strict liability of § 402A, must have resulted from the manufacturer's negligence in not
adopting a safe design. Similarly, if the manufacturer exercises reasonable care in the adoption of its
design, the design necessarily will not be unreasonably dangerous. The basis for this proposition is
the distinction between unavoidably unsafe and unreasonably dangerous products. An unavoidably
unsafe design is one that is incapable of being made safe for its intended use in the present state of
design achievement even if all possible due care has been exercised. Thus by definition, an
unavoidably unsafe sdesign-cannot-b-Cunreasonably dangerous. Consequently, if a manufacturer
employed a design only after totally fulfilling his duty of due care, and the design still proved to be
dangerous, the manufacturer would not be liable for negligence. Likewise, the manufacturer would
not be subject to strict liability if the design, although dangerous, was unavoidably unsafe and thus
was not deemed to be unreasonably dangerous.
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liability for design, therefore, should reach the same result using either
theory.31
Although the instant decision is a mere addition to the line of cases
that have adopted the Larsen rationale, it is important for its perceptive
analysis of the misconceptions underlying the Evans rule. Automobile
manufacturers have relied on Evans to support their arguments against
imposing liability for design defects that enhance injury during the
second accident. Defendant manufacturers have urged, and courts
considering the issue have agreed, that a duty to produce a crash-proof
car should not be imposed.39 The existence of this duty, however, is not
the controlling issue.4 The ultimate question is whether a manufacturer
should have a legal duty to design an automobile that will not expose its
occupants to an unreasonable risk of enhanced injuries following an
accident.4 Although a manufacturer may be incapable of producing a
crash-proof car given the existing level of technology, it should be under
a duty to minimize the injuries to the passengers once an accident has
occurred. Another argument frequently advanced by the manufacturer is
that collisions are not within the "intended or expected use" language of
section 398 and the comments under section 402A of the Restatement
(Second).4 2 This unrealistic contention ignores the statistical evidence
that more than one-fourth of all automobiles at some time are involved
in accidents producing injury or death. 43 Since a manufacturer is
required to anticipate the environment in which its product is to be
used,4 4 recent decisions have correctly concluded that automobile
manufacturers should foresee that automobiles may be involved in
accidents. 45 It is clear, therefore, that the "intended use" argument
should not be an obstacle to the imposition of liability.46 Manufacturers
38. There may be a slight theoretical difference in design cases between "intended use" in
strict liability and "expected use" in negligence, with the former being slightly narrower in scope.
See generally Wade, supra note 11. Courts, however, have not recognized this distinction.
39. E.g., Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); Schumard v.
General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp.
1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
40. See generally Nader & Page, supra note 4, at 656; 118 U. PA. L. REv. 299, 300 (1969).
41. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); 33 ALBANY L. REV.
238, 240 (1968); 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 396, 397-98. But see Pawlak, Manufacturer's Design Liability:
The Expanding Frontiers of the Law, 19 DFENsE L.J. 143, 157-71 (1970).
42. See cases cited note 39 supra.
43. Of the 102 million registered vehicles in the United States, 26 million were involved in
accidents in 1968 alone. 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 396, 398 n.22.
44. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1962).
45. E.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Dyson v. General
Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
46. The argument also has been made that the "intended use" test, limiting a manufacturer's
1971]
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
also have contended that liability should not be imposed for design
defects if it is shown that other producers employ a similar design.
Although the "state of the art" may be useful in determining the
standards to which the manufacturer will be held, it should be an
objective standard of safety and reasonableness based upon design
capabilities and economic practicalities and not a comparative standard
based on prevailing practices within the automobile industry.4 7 If a
particular design is found to be unreasonably dangerous after weighing
the economic burden on the manufacturer against the possibility and
gravity of harm to the consumer, then the manufacturer should not be
able to avoid liability merely because the design is widely used
throughout the industry. An additional assertion made by
manufacturers is that juries are unable to comprehend the intricacies of
automotive design or to apportion damages between injuries received in
the first accident and those enhanced by the defective design.18 Although
automotive designs are undoubtedly determined by experts, this is not an
effective argument because juries often are required to determine
applicable standards of care for experts.49 This same reasoning applies to
the apportionment of damages, which is frequently undertaken by
juries.50 Furthermore, mere difficulties with the jury system should not
be allowed to absolve the manufacturer of all liability for breach of its
duty and leave the injured party without legal redress.5 ' Finally,
manufacturers maintain that the determination of standards for
automotive design is a legislative function that should not be usurped by
the courts.52 Although legislative standards have definite advantages,
such as uniformity, section 108(c) of the National Traffic and Motor
liability, applies only to the conscious utilization of the product by its operator. A distinction can be
drawn between ordinary driving and intended misuse of an automobile. Consequently, a person
would not violate the intended use test of an automobile if he had an accident while driving
normally. Nader & Page, supra note 4, at 662.
47. See Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969). Learned Hand, speaking
of the necessity that tugs be equipped with radio receivers, said: "Courts must in the end say what is
required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
omission." The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
48. E.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968); see Nader &
Page, supra note 4, at 663.
49. See Bayshore Dev. Co. v. Bondfoey, 75 Fla. 455, 78 So. 507 (1918) (architect); Tremblay
v. Kimball, 107 Me. 53,77 A. 405 (1910) (pharmacist); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170,
174 N.E. 441 (1931) (accountant); A Symposium on Professional Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV.
535 (1959).
50. E.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968).
51. The manufacturer should be liable only for injuries over and above those that probably
would have resulted from the initial collision. Id.; see 118 U. PA. L. REv. 299, 303-04 (1969).
52. See cases cited note 22 supra.
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Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 is an explicit example of congressional intent
to enact legislation that is not all-inclusive or pre-emptive of common
law. 53 The judicial branch, therefore, has adequate power to determine
reasonable standards of automotive design5 and to impose liability for
injuries enhanced by defects. This imposition of liability for design
defects should produce greater emphasis on safety in automobile design
and should shift the cost of these injuries to the manufacturer, whose
insurance expense can then be distributed among the public as a cost of
doing business.55 The manufacturer will have an increased economic
burden, but the automotive industry is in a much better position than the
individual consumer to accept this burden.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (Supp. V, 1970) provides: "Compliance with any Federal motor
vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability
under common law." 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (Supp. V, 1970) states that the intent of the statute is to
protect the public against "risk of death or injury to persons in the event accidents do occur. ... "
For extensive treatment of the 1966 Act see Nader & Page, supra note 4, at 669-73; 1969 U. ILL.
L.F. 396; and 118 U. PA. L. REv. 229, 305-07 (1969).
54. "IT]he Federal minimum safety standards need not be interpreted as restricting State
common law standards of care. Compliance with such standards would thus not necessarily shield
any person from product liability at common law." S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1966).
55. Badorek v. General Motors Corp., II Cal. App. 3d 902, 923, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305, 319
(1970).
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